SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1916.

No. 600.

F. A. DICKSON, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,

28.

LUCK LAND COMPANY.

IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.

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1 STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Becker:

District Court, 7th Judicial District.

LUCK LAND COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff,

C. J. MINOR, F. A. DICKSON, and R. L. SMITH; Also All Other Persons Unknown Claiming Any Right, Title, Estate, Interest or Lien in the Real Estate Described in the Complaint Herein, Defendants.

· Complaint.

The plaintiff complains of the defendant and alleges:

1st. That the plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Minnesota, with its principal place of business at Waubun, Mahnomen county, Minnesota.

2nd. That it is the owner in fee of the following described premises situate in the county of Becker and state of Minnesota, viz:

lot seven (7) of section two (2) and the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section twenty-five (25), all in township one hundred forty-two (142), north of range thirty-nine (39), west.

3rd. That the said premises are vacant and unoccupied.

4th. That the defendan's claim an estate or interest in said premises or lien thereon adverse to plaintiff.

Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment.

1st. That it is the owner in fee of said premises.

2nd. That the defendants have no estate or interest in said premises or lien thereon.

3rd. For the costs and disbursements of this action.

JOHNSTON & DENNIS, Plaintiff's Attorney, Detroit, Minnesota.

(Duly verified.)

(Title of Cause.)

Separate Answer of F. A. Dickson.

The above named defendant Dickson for his answer to the complaint in the above entitled action, admits that the plaintiff is a corporation, that the land is vacant; denies that the plaintiff is the owner in fee of the premises described in the complaint and alleges that he is the owner in fee of said premises.

Wherefore, defendant demands judgment that he is the owner in

fee of said premises, that plaintiff has no estate or interest in the same and for his costs and disbursements in this action.

> CLYDE R. WHITE, Attorney for Defendant Dickson.

314 Minn. L. & T. Bldg., Minneapolis, Minnesota. (Duly verified.)

(Title of Cause.)

Separate Answer of R. L. Smith.

The defendant, R. L. Smith, for his personal answer to the complaint in the above entitled matter admits that the plaintiff is a corporation and that the land described in the complaint is vacant; denies that the plaintiff has any right, title or interest in or to such premises and alleges that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; and demands judgment that he is the owner in fee of said premises, that plaintiff has no right, title or interest in or to the same, and for his costs and disbursements.

JAY W. CRANE, Attorney for Defendant Smith.

900 Metropolitan Life Building, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Hennepin, 88:

R. L. Smith, being duly sworn, says he has read the within answer and knows its contents; that it is true except as to statements made therein upon information and belief and as to such he believes it to be true; that he is one of the above named defendants.

R. L. SMITH.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of Aug., 1914.

(Notarial Seal.)

J. A. SÉBESTA,

Notary Public.

Hennepin County, Minnesota. My commission expires Feb. 27, 1921.

(Separate answer of C. J. Minor not printed.)

(Title of Cause.)

Reply to Separate Answer of F. A. Dickson.

Comes now the plaintiff and for its reply to the separate answer of the defendant F. A. Dickson denies each and every allegation of new matter in the said answer contained and the whole thereof.

Wherefor the plaintiff demands judgment as prayed for in its complaint herein.

August 21st, 1914.

C. M. JOHNSTON AND FRED DENNIS, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Detroit, Minnesota. (Duly verified.)

5

(Title of Cause.)

Reply to Separate Answer of R. L. Smith.

Comes now the plaintiff and for its reply to the separate answer of the defendant R. L. Smith denies each and every allegation of new matter in said answer contained and the whole thereof.

Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment as prayed for in its

complaint herein.

August 21, 1914.

C. M. JOHNSTON AND FRED DENNIS, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Detroit, Minnesota.
(Duly verified.)
(Reply to separate answer of C. J. Miner not printed.)

(Title of Cause.)

Supplemental answer of F. A. Dickson.

The defendant F. A. Dickson, for his supplemental answer to the complaint herein, made and served under and pursuant to an order of this court made on the 17th day of October, 1914, to which reference is hereby made, alleges that on or about the 14th day of October, 1914, this defendant acquired all the right, title and interest of the defendant R. L. Smith in and to the land described in the complaint herein, which the said R. L. Smith possessed

the complaint herein, which the said R. L. Smith possessed or had at the commencement of this action, or claimed to possess and have at said date; that this defendant is the owner

possess and have at said date; that this defendant is the owner in fee of the said premises; that said land is vacant and unoccupied; that the plaintiff is not the owner in fee of said premises, and accordingly demands judgment that he is the owner in fee of said premises, that plaintiff has no estate or interest in the same, and for his costs and disbursements herein.

CLYDE R. WHITE, Attorney for Defendant Dickson,

314 Minn. Loan & Trust Bldg., Minneapolis, Minnesota.

(Duly verified.)

(Title of Cause.)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

This action was on the calendar of causes for the October, 1914, general term of the above named court, and was tried by the court, without a jury, on October 17th, 1914.

Messrs. Johnson & Dennis and Marshall A. Spooner appeared as attorneys for the plaintiff, and Messrs. C. C. Haupt and Clyde R. White appeared as attorneys for the defendant F. A. Dickson.

No appearance was made at the trial for any other defendant, although defendants C. J. Minor and R. L. Smith had appeared in said action and answered the plaintiff's complaint therein.

From the evidence, after submission of the case upon the oral arguments and written briefs of the respective attorneys, the court finds as facts:

I.

That the plaintiff is a corporation, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Minnesota, with its principal place of business at Waubun, Mahnomen county, Minnesota.

II.

That Me-gis-way-waish-kung, who is otherwise known as George Wah-way-cumig, is a mixed blood Chippewa Indian of the White Earth Indian Reservation; that the lands described in the plaintiff's complaint herein, to-wit: lot seven (7) of section two (2) and the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter (NE½ NE½) of section twenty-five (25), in township one hundred forty-two (142) north, of range thirty-nine (39) west, are within the limits of said Reservation, and are situate in the county of Becker and state of Minnesota; that prior to April 24th, 1908, said lands were duly allotted to said Indian; that on said day said Indian made application to the land department of the United States for a patent to said lands in fee simple; that on August 6th, 1908, the United States issued to said Indian a patent in fee simple to said lands, which was recorded in the office of the register of deeds of Becker county, Minnesota, on November 16, 1908, in book thirty-four of deeds on page two hundred thirty-five.

8 III.

That said Me-gis-way-waish-kung was born in April or May, 1889.

IV.

That on April 24, 1908, said Indian, for a valuable consideration, made, executed and delivered to one A. C. Knudson a warranty deed

of said premises, which was recorded in the office of said register of deeds on April 27, 1908, in book thirty of deeds on page one hundred fifty-nine; that on December 1, 1908, the said A. C. Knudson made, executed and delivered to one C. F. Peterson a quitclaim deed of said premises, which was on said day recorded in the office of said register of deeds in book thirty-one (31) of deeds on page ninety-seven (97); that on December 3, 1909, the said C. F. Peterson and Emily, his wife, made, executed and delivered to one R. L. Smith a quit-claim deed of said premises, which was recorded in the office of said register of deeds on July 1, 1912, in book forty-one of deeds on page two hundred ninety; and that on October 14, 1914, said R. L. Smith made, executed and delivered to the defendant F. A. Dickson a quit claim deed of said premises.

V.

That on January 17, 1910, said Indian made, executed and delivered to one Louis J. Carpenter a warranty deed of said premises, which was recorded in the office of the register of deeds on June 27, 1910, in book forty of deeds on page three hundred ninety-two; that through error in transcribing said deed upon said record the date thereof appears in said record as June 17, 1910; that on the first day of November, 1913, said Louis J. Carpenter and Margery, his wife, made, executed, and delivered to the defendant F. A. Dickson a quit-claim deed of said premises, which was recorded in the office of said register of deeds on November 3, 1913, in book forty-six of deeds on page one hundred forty-three; that prior to giving said deed, to-wit on September 5, 1910, said Louis J. Carpenter had made, executed and delivered to one L. S. Waller a quit claim deed of said premises, and that on January 15, 1912, said L. S. Waller and M. S. Waller, his wife, made, executed and delivered to the plaintiff a quit claim deed of said premises, which was recorded in the office of said register of deeds in book forty-one of deeds on page 265; but that defendant Dickson, at the time he received his said deed from Louis J. Carpenter, had no notice or knowledge of the existence of said prior deed to said L. S. Waller, or said deed from said L. S. Waller to the plaintiff, but purchased said premises from said Carpenter in good

VI.

faith and for a valuable consideration.

That on November 23, 1911, said Indian made, executed and delivered to the plaintiff a warranty deed of said premises, which was recorded in the office of said register of deeds on December 1, 1911, in book forty of deeds on page two hundred twenty-eight, and that on July 12, 1913, said Indian made, executed and delivered to the plaintiff a warranty deed of said premises, which was recorded in the office of said register of deeds on July 17, 1913, in book forty of deeds on page five hundred fifty-nine.

VII.

That said lands are vacant and unoccupied.

Conclusions of Law.

The Court finds as conclusions of law:

I.

That plaintiff is the owner in fee of the above described lands.

II.

That no one of the defendants has any estate or interest in said premises, or any lien thereon.

III.

That plaintiff is entitled to recover the costs and disbursements of this action to be taxed.

Let judgment be entered accordingly.

Dated February 13, 1915.

By the Court,

WILLIAM L. PARSONS,

District Judge.

Note.—Me-gis-way-waish-kung, the patentee of the lands in dispute, was a mixed-blood Chippewa Indian of the White Earth Reservation. He became of legal age in April or May, 1910. On April 24, 1908, he made application for a fee patent based upon a previous allotment, and the patent was issued August 6, 1908. Defendant Dickson derives title from two deeds made by the patentee, one dated

April 24, 1908, to A. C. Knudson and one dated January 17, 1910, to Louis J. Carpenter. Plaintiff claims under two deeds from the Indian dated November 23, 1911, and July 12, 1913, respectively.

The deeds from the patentee to plaintiff vested title in it, provided the question of patentee's minority when he gave the deeds under which defendant Dickson claims is a proper subject of inquiry

in this action and is not foreclosed by the patent.

To carry out the policy of individual allotments, which superseded the system of tribal holdings of lands among the Indians, the egeneral Indian allotment act of February 8, 1887 (24 St. 388), made provision for the issuance to Indians in severalty, upon the approval of the allotments by the secretary of the interior, of so-called trust patents, whereby the lands conveyed were declared to be held in trust for the benefit of the patentee for a period of twenty-five years, and conveyances of such lands and any contracts touching the same during that time were made absolutely null and void. At the expiration of the trust period the Indian would receive a fee patent to his land and thereupon would have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the state or territory in which he might reside.

The so-called Clapp Amendment (Act of June 21, 1906, 34 St. 325, as amended by the Act of March 1, 1907, 34 St. 1015) so far as the same applied to Mixed Blood Indians, provided as follows:

That all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation for allotments within the White Earth Reservation in the state of Minnesota, now or hereafter held by adult mixed-blood Indians, are hereby removed, and the trust deeds heretofore or hereafter executed by the department for such allotments are hereby declared to pass the title in fee simple, or such mixed-bloods, upon application, shall be entitled to receive a patent in fee simple for such allotments."

It was under this amendment that Me-gis-way-waish-kung applied for and received his fee patent.

Neither the charge of the policy of the government in its attitude towards the Indians, which in the case of the Indians on the White Earth Reservation culminated in the 1906 amendment, nor the language of the amendment indicates any purpose on the part of the government to encourage the alienation by Indians of their lands, whatever may have been the actual result. The government's Indian policy in the final stage of its evolution emancipates the Chippewa mixed-blood of the White Earth Reservation from governmental wardship and purports to place him upon a level with other men in citizenship, opportunities and responsibilities. It gives him fee title to his land in severalty and removes all restrictions upon its sale, incumbrance and taxation, so that he is in precisely the same situation with respect to dealing with his land as any other fee owner of lands under patent from the United States. This is the natural construction of the language of the amendment. There is no in-

dication of an intent to assist the Indians in getting rid of their lands, but, in pursuance of the abandonment by the government of its paternal policy toward the Indians, they are freed from restrictions in dealing with the lands. Those restrictions consisted only in the prohibition against conveyances and contracts touching the land during the trust period. Vachon v. Nichols-Chisholm Lumber Co., 126 Minn. 312.

There is no indication of an intent on the part of Congress to control or supervise in any way the disposition by the Indian of his lands acquired by patent under the 1906 amendment. The Act of 1887 expressly places the Indian under the dominion of the state laws after patent is issued, and such laws control his further dealings with the land. In the present case the laws of Minnesota respecting conveyances by minors are of undoubted application, unless the question of the Indian's age has been set at rest by the patent itself. That such is the effect of the patent is contended by the defendant Dickson, who earnestly insists that the attempt to defeat his title by showing the Indian's minority at the time he made the

deeds under which the defendant claims is a collateral attack upon

the patent.

The effect and conclusiveness of a land patent issued by the United States forms the subject of numberless adjudications in the federal and state courts. Such patents constitute "safe and assured evidence of ownership" (Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 532). "The patent is the highest evidence of title and is conclusive as against the govern-

ment and all claiming under junior patents or titles until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal" (U. S. v.

Stone, 2 Wall. 525). "We hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question in any court, state or federal, is whether a title to land which had once been the property of the United States had passed, that question must be resolved by the laws of the United States, and that whenever according to those laws the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other property in the state, is subject to the state legislation so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United States" (Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498).

"A patent issued by the officers of the Land Department of the United States in a case within the scope of their power or jurisdiction is dual in its effect. It is an adjudication of those officers that the patentee is entitled to the land under the laws of the United States, and it is a conveyance of the title to that land to the patentee" (U. S. v. Winona & St. P. Ry. Co., 67 Fed. 948). "(The land department) as we have repeatedly said was appointed to supervise the various proceedings whereby a conveyance of the title from the United States to portions of the public domain is obtained, and to see that the requirements of different acts of Congress are fully complied with. Necessarily, therefore, it must consider and pass upon the qualifications of the applicant, the acts he has performed, to secure the title the nature of the land and whether it is of the

15 class which is opened to sale. Its judgment upon these matters is that of a special tribunal and is unassailable except by direct proceedings for its annulment or limitation. Such has been the uniform language of this court in repeated decisions" (Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447). The cases of Polk's Lessee v. Wendell. 9 Cranch 87; Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat. 379; Johnson v. Tousley, 13 Wall, 72; Franch v. Fyan, 93 U. S. 169; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636; Burke v. S. Pac. R. R. Co., 234 U. S. 669; McKinney v. Bode, 33 Minn. 450; O'Connor v. Gertgens, 85 Minn. 481; White & Street Townsite Co. v. J. Neils Lumber Co., 100 Minn. 16; Holland v. Netterberg, 107 Minn. 380; State v. Red River Lumber Co., 109 Minn. 185, and numerous other authorities repeat and apply the same rule. But it is not deemed applicable to the present case for the reason that no attack is here made on the patent. Both parties claim under the patent and it would seem anomalous to characterize the plaintiff's contention as an attack upon the source of its own title. The application of the rule has been confined to attempts to impeach the title of the patentee and thus undo the determination of the Land Department as to the facts anterior to the issuance of

the patent. The proceedings before the officers of the Land Depart-

ment are ex parte and summary in their nature (State of Minn. v. Machelder, 1 Wall. 109). The ultimate question is whether or not a patent shall issue, and the facts found are conclusive only when

the action of the department is assailed.

16 The question, as was conceded by counsel upon the argument, is the same as in the case of a conveyance by any minor patentee who has received his patent under a law which required him to be of legal age. I am unable to reach any other conclusion than that the state laws respecting minority govern conveyances by any minor patentee.

W. L. P.

(Title of Cause.)

Settled Case.

The above entitled action came on for trial at the general October, 1914, term of the above named court, before the Honorable William

L. Parsons, judge presiding.

Messrs. C. M. Johnston, Fred Dennis and Marshall A. Spooner appearing as attorneys for the plaintiff, and Messrs. Clyde R. White and C. C. Haupt appearing as attorneys for the defendant F. A. Dickson.

It is stipulated that the records which are about to be introduced in evidence are the official records of the register of deeds office in

and for Becker county, Minnesota.

Plaintiff offers in evidence the record of an instrument recorded at page 235 of deed record number 34, Becker county, Minnesota, which is a patent from the United States of America to Me-gis-waywaish-kung, and which patent is dated on the 6th day of August, 1908, and filed for record on the 16th day of November, 1908, at eieven o'clock A. M.

It is admitted that Me-gis-way-waish-kung is a mixed blood Indian.

17 Plaintiff offers in evidence the record of an instrument recorded in deed record forty of Becker county, at page 228, This is a deed from Me-gis-way-waish-kung, a single man, of Carlisle, Cumberland county, Pennsylvania, for one dollar and other valuable consideration, to the Luck Land Company, the plaintiff, a corporation, conveying lot seven, section two and the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section twenty-five, township 142 north, range 39 west of the 5th principal meridian, dated November 23, 1911, and which is acknowledged in the District of Columbia, county of Washington, on the 23rd day of November, 1911, before Simon Beebe, notary public, with his seal attached, and filed December first, 1911, and on which Louis J. Carpenter appears as one of the witnesses.

Plaintiff offers in evidence the record of an instrument recorded at page eight of Miscellaneous Records "O", Becker county, being a contract for deed between Me-gis-way-waish-kung and Louis J. Carpenter, recorded July 15th, 1910.

Objected to as immaterial. Objection overruled. Exception.

Plaintiff offers in evidence a quit-claim deed dated on the 5th day of September, 1910, between Louis J. Carpenter, a single man, of the county of Pipestone, state of Minnesota, and L. S. Waller of the county of Mahnomen, state of Minnesota, for the expressed consideration of one dollar, conveying the lands in controversy; the

acknowledgment of Louis J. Carpenter being taken before Louis D. Davis, who also subscribed as one of the witnesses. Not recorded. The same being marked Exhibit "A."

Objected to because it has not been shown that Carpenter had any title to this land to convey and the introduction of the instrument is objected to as incompetent.

Objection overruled. Exception.

Plaintiff offers in evidence the record of an instrument, being quit-claim deed, recorded at page 265 of deed record 41 of the records of Becker county, being such a deed from L. S. Waller and M. S. Waller his wife to the plaintiff Luck Land Company, a corporation, dated January 15th, 1912, conveying the premises in controversy for an expressed consideration of \$658.40, acknowledged on the 15th day of January, 1912, before Louis D. Davis, notary public, Mahnomen county, Minnesota, who also subscribed as a witness to the deed, filed April 26th, 1912.

Objection overruled. Exception.

Plaintiff offers in ewidence the record of an instrument recorded in Deed Record Number 40, Becker county, Minnesota, page 559. This is a deed from Me-gis-way-waish-kung to the Luck Land Company, dated July 12, 1913, recorded July 17, 1913, the expressed consideration of one dollar and other valuable consideration, conveying the property in controversy. It is acknowledged on the day of its date before Louis D. Davis, a notary public in Mahnomen county, Minnesota, who also subscribes as a witness.

Mr. Houpt: This is objected to for the reason that it already appears that this grantor had previously parted with all his title in this land and therefore it is incompetent.

Objection overruled. Exception.

Plaintiff rests.

The defendant Dickson offers in evidence a warranty deed recorded in book forty of deeds in the office of the register of deeds in and for Becker county, Minnesota, page 392, from Me-gis-way-waish-kung to Louis J. Carpenter, bearing date June 17th, 1910, recorded June 27, 1910, at 10:30 o'clock A. M., and containing the same representation with regard to the grantor's being a mixed blood adult Chippewa Indian, that has been heretofore read by counsel, and reciting also a reference to the same Act of Congress, conveying the land described in this proceeding.

Mr. Spooner: That is objected to as immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent, and also, unless the full and complete instrument it-

self, recorded as one instrument, be offered in its entirety, and in connection with that objection, we offer to show at this time that this deed was mistakingly and wrongly recorded as to the date of the instrument, and we here and now present for the court's consideration in connection with this objection and with this offer the original instrument, which instrument bears the same number endorsed on its back as the record thereof, attached to the record, being

Number 52593, and which bears the certificate of the register of deeds of Becker county, Minneseta, showing the record

of the deed on the 27th day of June, 1910, at 10:30 o'clock A. M., as appears in the marginal note and memorandum of record by the register of deeds on the copy thereof as it appears in the records of said county, in deed record number 40 on page 392, and for the purpose of letting the record show the offer of this instrument it will be marked, if the court please, plaintiff's Exhibit "B."

Argument.

20

Mr. Houpt: We make the further objection that it now appears that a fee patent is issued for this land to the Indian in question and that anything contained in the deed contradictory of that patent

is immaterial and ineffective for any purpose.

The Court: I think it would be best to take in all this record evidence subject to the various objections, and arguments can be made at leisure by the attorneys. I would be inclined at the present time to take in all this record evidence subject to the various objections. I am not at all sure that this is competent evidence of any recital that may be contained in it. Of course the statute makes an instrument evidence that is recorded, that is evidence prima facie, but whether it is evidence of facts extraneous to the purpose of that instrument, which is the transfer of title to real estate there is some question there, and I think it would be best to take in the evidence on this hearing subject to the objections.

Mr. Spooner: Let me ask your Honor to rule at this time on the offer of the original deed in connection with my ob-

jection; let us have a record on that.

The Court: You first made the objection to the offer of counsel

and then you followed it up by your own offer.

Mr. Spooner: The offer made by us of Exhibit "B" was to lay a foundation for one of the objections which we made at the time, and I would like to have a ruling.

The Court: Would you like to have that instead of the other.

Mr. Spooner: Yes, sir.

Mr. Houpt: I have no objection to the introduction of the original instrument with the limitation that counsel has placed upon his offer.

The Court: Then it will be received for that purpose.

Mr. Spooner: Now at this time I want to take an exception to any ruling which may be hereafter entered in the record adverse to the objection made to this instrument last offered by the defendant.

The Court: In regard to the introduction of the record, I think the entire record should go in subject to your objection, Mr. Houpt,

so that the record will show the entire instrument subject to counsel's objection and exception. My theory being that I will take in all of this record evidence, at least, and at leisure, and with the assistance of briefs perhaps, pass upon the questions that are raised.

Mr. Houpt: The defendant Dickson offers in evidence next a quit-claim deed recorded in book forty-six of deeds, page 143,
of the records of the register of deeds of Becker county,

Minnesota, bearing date November first, 1913, of the land described in the complaint herein, from Louis J. Carpenter and Margaret Carpenter his wife to the defendant F. A. Dickson, acknowledged on the first day of November, 1913, before C. F. E. Peterson,

notary public, Hennepin county.

deed was offered.

Mr. Spooner: Now, we wish to offer an objection to that instrument and that objection is that it is immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent and because no proper foundation has been laid for it, and the further objection that it appears from this instrument and by the admission of counsel, that the grantor in this instrument, Louis J. Carpenter, is the same person who was the grantee in the last instrument offered by the defendant, being the deed recorded in book forty of deeds, this county, page 392, and because it appears upon the face of such last instrument that the grantor Megis-way-waish-kung at the time of the acknowledgment of such last instrument was a male mixed blood Chippewa Indian, and was not an adult, but was a minor less than twenty-one years of age at the time of such execution of such instrument, and for all of the reasons and objections urged to the reception of the instrument recorded in book forty of deeds on page 392 at the time such instrument was offered. And plaintiff at this time offers in connection with such objection the original instrument, for the purpose of such objection, as the same appears in the objection made to the said deed recorded in book forty of deeds, page 392, at the time such

The Court: Any objection of this original instrument?

Mr. Houpt: Simply for the purpose of showing the discrepancy of the date in the record.

The Court: It will be received for that purpose.

Mr. Spooner: I would like to have the same exception and record made and to do so in the record as was stated temporarily at least

overruling the objection made to the former.

The Court: I have not ruled on those yet. I was simply ruling in your favor as to introducing that instrument for the purpose stated. I will receive the evidence subject to your objection and your exception to that and all similar rulings will be noted.

Mr. Spooner: And entered later in case the ruling should be

adverse to us?

23

The Court: Yes.

The defendant Dickson offers in evidence an instrument recorded in book thirty of deeds, page 159 of the records of the register of deeds in and for Becker county, Minnesota, from Me-gis-way-waishkung to A. C. Knudson, conveying the premises described in the

complaint, bearing date the 24th day of April, 1908, and acknowledged as of the same date, calling attention to the same recitals in it with regard to the Indian-the grantor-being a mixed blood adult Chippewa Indian and to the act of Congress heretofore alluded to in the former deeds; filed for record on the 27th day of April.

1908, at four o'clock P. M. 24

Mr. Spooner: What does that offer include?

Mr. White: Intended to include the deed recorded on that page, but not the affidavit that is not part of the instrument.

Mr. Houpt: This is the same que-tion your Honor has ruled on

before.

Mr. Spooner: We have here, your Honor, an abstract of the title of this land brought down to the 5th day of February, 1914. From that abstract it does not appear that defendant Dickson derived title to the land, or purports to derive title to the land through this conveyance offered in evidence, and I desire to ask counsel at this time whether or not he proposes to show title in the defendant Dickson by or through any unrecorded instrument in the line following this transfer?

Mr. Houpt: I will say, if the court please, this offer is made, among other purposes, to show that the plaintiff here has not title to this land. Of course the plaintiff must recover upon a paper title,

and that is one of the purposes of offering this record.

Mr. Spooner: We have this situation: The defendant Smith, who apparently has claimed some title under a deed from C. F. E. Peterson, who apparently has claimed a conveyance from this man Knudson, is in default in this action, and the defendant Dickson in this case is asking affirmative relief and he is not attempting to prevail in this case merely by defeating the plaintiff's title, but is also seeking relief to the effect that he is the owner. Now, I don't understand that the rule upon which counsel apparently relies fits

this case in the claim that in an ordinary action to determine 25 adverse claims the defendant may defeat the plaintiff's estate by showing title in a third person. Now that is inconsistent here.

We have shown our line of title-

The Court: Your position is that the defendant Dickson could

not show title in a third person in any event?

Mr. Spooner: Not in a case like this where he is asking for affirmative relief showing title in himself and offered proof to that effect for that purpose.

The Court: Would that debar him from defeating your cause of

action?

Mr. Houpt: Your Honor has announced that you would receive

these instruments subject to the objection.

The Court: Yes, as a general proposition I intend to take in all instruments that have to do with this title in any way, or appear to have to do with the title, unless it should absolutely clearly appear that they do not. If it is going to take any time I should merely take this in subject to the objection.

Mr. Spooner: I want to let stand what I have stated as an objec-

tion to the reception of this instrument, and in addition thereto further that it already appears from the evidence offered on the part of the resisting defendant—the contesting defendant—that this instrument was executed at least two years prior to the coming

of age of the grantor named in the instrument, as disclosed 26 by the evidence already, and as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and no foundation laid.

The Court: The instrument will be received in evidence subject to the objection.

The defendant Dickson offers in evidence an instrument recorded in book thirty-one of deeds, page 97, of the office of the register of deeds in and for Becker county, Minnesota, bearing date of December first, 1908, and acknowledged as of the same date, and recorded upon the same date, from A. C. Knudson, single man, to C. F. Peterson, and conveying by a quit-claim deed the land and premises described in the complaint in this action.

Mr. Spooner: Objected to on the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, no foundation laid, and because it already appears by the testimony offered on the part of the defendant and from another instrument, a portion of which was offered, recorded in book forty of deeds on page 392, that the grantor of the same premises of the said A. C. Knudson was a minor at the time of the deed last offered from the patentee We-gis-way-waishkung to A. C. Knudson.

The Court: It will be received subject to this objection.

Mr. Spooner: And the same exception.

The Court: That is understood; the record will show that.

The defendant Dickson offers in evidence the instrument recorded in book forty-one of deeds, page 290, in the office of the register of deeds in and for Becker county, the same being a record of

27 a quit-claim deed bearing date of December 3, 1909, acknowledged December 3, 1912, filed for record July 1st, 1912, at nine o'clock A. M., and to the property, among others, described in the complaint, from C. F. Peterson and Emily Peterson, his wife, to R. L. Smith.

Mr. Spooner: The same objection to this as to the last instrument and to each of the other instruments offered on the part of the defendant.

The Court: Received subject to the objection.

Defendant Dickson offers in evidence defendant's Exhibit "1". a quit-claim deed bearing date October 14, 1914, from R. L. Smith, a single man, to F. A. Dickson, and to the property described in the complaint herein acknowledged October 14th, 1914, not recorded as yet.

Objected to upon each of the several grounds heretofore urged as an objection to each of the several instruments heretofore offered on the part of the defense, and on the further ground that this instrument is dated and acknowledged subsequent to the commencement of this action and the interposition of the defense therein.

The Court: I would like to hear you on that.

(Arguments.)

Mr. Houpt: If the court deems it necessary we would ask that we be allowed to amend our answer so as to embrace this additional title—file a supplemental answer.

The Court: Any objection to filing supplemental answer?

Mr. Spooner: Here is the defendant R. L. Smith, the grantor in this instrument, who stands here with an answer declaring that the title is in himself.

The Court: But that would not be inconsistent with the supplemental answer on the part of defendant Dickson, reciting title

in him,

Mr. Spooner: A supplemental answer at this time might throw us in a position we feel where we are placed in a position where we would like to have an opportunity to examine Mr. Smith as a witness in this case, and we can't do it with a supplemental answer coming in now. Now, it is possible that a time may come in the trial of this case when there will be several matters to be inquired into, especially in view of the uncertain situation of the record here by reason of the reservation of rulings. If such a supplemental answer is filed why we certainly shall not be reluctant to ask that there be opportunity given here to offer other testimony. impossible for me to lay all the facts before the court in my statement at this time, but an amendment of the answer of Dickson at this time may necessarily result in requiring the plaintiff to offer proof here that might not be necessary provided the record stands as it is at the present time, and I do not believe we are prepared for an amendment of the character referred to at this time with the proof It is a matter that I am not advised of entirely because I have had no opportunity to consult with counsel on the subject, and evidently it is deemed important enough by the defense and I ap-

prehend is important enough for the consideration of the plaintiff so that we may have an opportunity to determine

whether we can anticipate that situation.

The Court: At the present time it is not apparent to the court how you are surprised or embarrassed in this request to file a supplemental answer showing this transfer, and I will permit the supplemental answer to be filed, leaving it to the plaintiff, if he desires to do so to make application for opportunity to put in the proof necessitated by the filing of this supplemental answer.

Mr. Spooner: It probably will develop in putting in the testimony here so that it will be just as apparent here to your honor as to our

selves.

The Court: Very well, you will have an opportunity to make the application then.

Mr. Spooner: I will like to have an exception to the ruling.

The Court: Do I understand then that a supplemental answer will be filed?

Mr. Houpt: Will it be necessary to file that immediately, or can we file that a little later.

The Court: It won't be necessary to file it today, but it will be necessary to know whether it will be filed.

Mr. Houpt: Yes, sir; it will be filed.

Mr. Spooner: I would like to make the further statement in considering this and I hope you will consider it before the ruling is made that the defendant here should state and exercise its option, if it has any, on which line of title it relies here. Now, as I understand this record—and if I am wrong I hope counsel will

30 correct me—in the first instance the defendant's title upon which it relies is obtained through this deed dated January 17th, 1910, misdated June 17th, 1910, and filed June 27th, 1910, recorded in book forty of deeds on page 392, from Me-gis-way-waish-kung to Louis J. Carpenter; and then upon the quit-claim deed based upon that conveyance from Louis J. Carpenter and Margaret Carpenter his wife to F. A. Dickson, dated November first, 1913, and filed November 3, 1913; now I want to ask if that is the title

first relied upon by the defendant here?

Mr. Houpt: We stand upon whatever we purchased of these titles—all of them that we purchased. There is not any way of compelling us to elect here.

Mr. Spooner: So I understand that that is your first source of

title with which you started out here?

Mr. Houpt: We have offered all the title we could get. If any of

it shows that we own the land-

Mr. Spooner: Here, if your Honor please, are two inconsistent and contradictory positions. Here is the deed to Carpenter from the Indian—the mixed blood,—and a quit claim deed from Carpenter to Dickson; now that title is absolutely inconsistent with the title which they have since sought to develop in a previous deed from the mixed blood to Knudson, from Knudson to Peterson—from Peterson to Smith and Smith to the defendant Dickson dated October 14, 1914; and right at this point I am going to ask that the court

require the defendant to elect upon which ones of those titles

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31 it predicates its defense here.

The Court: I will hear you further in regard to that. Your position is not apparent to me at this time. It does not appear to me that they should be required to elect.

Mr. Houpt: Wouldn't the election, be reciprocal then, your Honor? The plaintiff in this case has introduced titles through

different channels.

Mr. Spooner: No, we have not. It all starts from this party, the mixed blood, and the last deed is simply confirmatory of the other transaction. Now this is a different proposition.

(Argument.)

Mr. Spooner: I demand now that the court order the defendant Dickson to elect upon which of those two lines of title he will stand. The Court: The motion is denied.

Mr. Spooner: Exception.

Mr. Houpt: Now, if the court please, sufficient has appeared here to indicate that the title in this case comes through an Indian of the White Earth Indian Reservation, a patent. For the purpose of

establishing the basis upon which this patent issued—the source of the patent—and for no other purpose, I ask at this time to introduce the trust patent which preceded the fee patent—I was mistaken, we don't have the trust patent. It is on the way. But I will say that under the laws of 1887—the Act of 1887 provided for the allotment of lands to Indians, and instruments issued giving the

Indians right of possession in certain tracts of land in severalty and reserving the title in the United States for a period of twenty-five years. That is the instrument that was issued to this Indian that I desire to introduce, but it is not here, but I would like to reserve the privilege of introducing it when it arrives; it will be in St. Paul—or Minneapolis—by the time we return. Now, in addition to that the Act referred to here is commonly known as an Act—known as an Act to remove restrictions; it is the Act of March first 1907, amending the Act of June 21, 1906, which provided as follows (reading Act):

Now, as following up the trust patent and as showing the basis for the issuance of the fee patent I desire to introduce a certified copy of the application of the Indian in question here for a fee patent: and as a further part of this record I would desire to reserve the right to introduce the order of the secretary of the interior directing a fee patent to issue. This order is referred to in the fee patent; that also we will have at the time we return to Minneapolis; and I do that for the purpose of simply laying the founda-

tion of showing the basis for the issuance of the fee patent.

Certified copy of application marked Exhibit "2".

Mr. Spooner: Now we want to object to that as entirely immaterial and irrelevant. The patent was issued, and the patent was issued on the condition of alienation by the patentee prescribed by the Acts of Congress. The only purpose that I can see that would inure to the defendant in this case by the introduction of this application is that it may contain—

Mr. Houpt: I don't offer this document for that purpose

at all, your Honor.

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The Court: Offered for the limited purpose you stated.

Mr. Houpt: That is all.

Mr. Spooner: It is not competent evidence of the qualification of the mixed blood to dispose of his property.

Mr. Houpt: I don't offer it for that purpose.
Mr. Spooner: Then it is immaterial entirely.

The Court: For the limited purpose stated by counsel the instrument will be received, subject to the objection of counsel; and the same course will be taken with respect to the other instruments.

Mr. Spooner: An exception will be entered if the ruling is adverse.

The Court: The record will show that that is true in all cases. Mr. Spooner: I desire to call the court's attention to the fact, and I object to Exhibit "2" on the further ground that it appears upon these papers and from the face of them, that this is not a record—that these are not instruments issued upon any recommendation such as is required by the rules of the department, and which will

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be shown afterwards if the court has doubt on that subject, and because all through there is no proper or sufficient acknowledgment or oath in either instance where the same purports to have been taken, as required by law. There is no seal in any case and there is no evidence that these things were done in the way of taking an oath

that seem to be prescribed by the rules as indicated by the

34 face of this instrument.

The Court: We will let that be a part of the objection and my ruling will remain the same.

Defendant Dickson rests.

(Testimony of Clyde R. White, Louis D. Davis, A. J. Powers, Fred Dennis, A. F. Anderson, Carl Erickson, L. S. Waller, Me-gis-way-waish-kung, Nah-wah-she-bi-ko-quay, J. A. Sealander, Wah-we-way-cumig, and C. M. Johnston, not printed except the following extracts therefrom):

Louis D. Davis, called as a witness on the part of the plaintiff and being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Q. And what is your business?

A. I am an attorney at law.

Q. And admitted to practice law?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Mr. Carpenter had been working for Mr. Waller at that time; worked over a year in buying lands and such work.

Q. And straightening out titles?

A. Yes, sir. And in January, 1910, he made a deal in the first place with this Me-gis-way-waish-kung and took it in his own name, but for the benefit of Mr. Waller——

Q. January 17th, 1910?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is the deed that was offered in evidence here by the defense and in which the record was misstated June 17th?

A. J. Powers, called as a witness on the part of plaintiff, and being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Q. Have you there the annuity records of 1891?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what is the date of that roll?

A. Covers the payment for the second quarter of 1891.

Q. Now, if you please, Mr. Powers, will you turn to that part of

the record where it names this individual?

A. On page one of this annuity roll at number 4, there appears the name of Me-Gis-Way-Waish-Kung, son, age two, sex M., per capita 10.83.

ME-GIS-WAY-WAISH-KUNG, called as a witness on the part of plaintiff, and being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Q. Who gave you that check?

Mr. White: We object to that as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and also object to it as in effect an effort to impeach the patent involved in this case, as an effort to impeach the judgment of the land department of the United States in a collateral proceeding, as an attempt to impeach a written instrument by parol testimony, and also upon the ground which has been generally laid heretofore in regard to this line of testimony.

NAH-WAH-SHE-BI-Ko-QUAY, called as a witness on the part of plaintiff, being duly sworn testified as follows:

Q. When was the boy Me-Gis-Way-Waish-Kung born? 346 A. When I first heard that he was born, he was born in April.

Q. What year?A. The year before the Treaty.

No cross examination.

WAY-WE-YAH-CUNIG, called as a witness on the part of plaintiff and being first duly sworn testified as follows:

Q. Did or did not you have any children born to you and to her at a date near to the Rice Treaty?

A. There was one child born just before the Treaty.
Q. Was it in the same year with the Treaty?

A. That same year that my boy was born that Mr. Rice came around and made the Treaty.

Q. Ask her what the boy's name was?

A. Me-Gis-Way-Waish-Kung.

Q. That would be in the late spring or early summer?

A. It was in the spring. Q. In the late spring?

A. Yes, sir.

C. M. JOHNSON, called as a witness on the part of plaintiff and being first duly sworn testified as follows:

Q. Do you know the date of the Rice Treaty?

A. I do; I know when they were here.

Q. When was that?

A. In the year 1889. I think they were here in June or July, perhaps both months and I don't know but what into August. 35 A. Yes, sir.

Mr. Spooner: Here are two things we are going to prove. We are going to prove as an independent fact and as an independent issue, but also connected with this matter here, that this mixed blood was not in fact of age until the 16th day of May, 1910. We are going to show as another independent fact, but immediately connected with this, that Simon Michelet was told of and had knowledge of the existence of the unrecorded conveyance from Carpenter to Waller and from Waller to the Luck Land Company.

The Court: But does this bear upon that question?

Mr. Spooner: It certainly does.

The Court: I understood you to say that this was along the line of showing notice on the part of the alleged agent or representative of Dickson. I would not want to go too far afield here, but I am willing to go into this question of notice, if you can show it.

Mr. Spooner: I am going to show that the existence of the Carpenter deed and the reason why it was not relied upon, because he was a minor, was told to Mr. Michelet, and then that the contract was made subsequently to take its place. That is what we are going to show.

Mr. Houpt: Now, if the court please, in relation to the minority of this mixed blood it is the position of the defendant here that the question of that minority is settled, and it is settled beyond the power of this court or any court in a preceding of this kind

power of this court or any court in a proceeding of this kind to question. It is settled just as a judgment of the court settles a question.

Mr. Spooner: May I ask counsel, so I may understand, by the in-

troduction of this last exhibit?

Mr. Houpt: By the introduction of the patent. The question is objected to on the ground that the issue of minority is foreclosed, and this court is precluded from going into that question and investigating it, by the action of the secretary of the interior, by issuing the patent.

(Argument.)

Mr. Houpt: I desire to take an exception to your Honor's ruling and have it further understood that any further testimony offered in the case bearing upon the question of the age of the Indian involved in this case is objected to as incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant for the reason that the question of the age of this Indian was submitted to the determination of the secretary of the interior and that he found as a fact, which was within his jurisdiction, that the Indian was an adult mixed blood, and in confirmation of that finding the patent in fee was issued to this Indian, and that the issuance of that patent based upon that finding and the application for a patent in evidence here is conclusive of the question of the Indian's age in the trial of this action, and any testimony which is introduced it will be considered it is excepted to.

The Court: We can remain here and secure his testimony if de-

sired.

Ruling reserved.

It is stipulated that defendant's Exhibits "1" and "2" may be withdrawn from the possession of the reporter for use in a case to be tried in the District Court in Mahnomen county involving the land there situated, and that a true, full and correct copy thereof may be substituted therefor.

ME-GIS-WAY-WAISH-KUNG, called as a witness on the part of the plaintiff and being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Q. Who gave you that check?

Mr. White: We object to that as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and also object to it as in effect an effort to impeach the patent involved in this case, as an effort to impeach the judgment of the land department of the United States in a collateral proceeding, as an attempt to impeach a written instrument by parol testimony, and also upon the ground which has been generally laid heretofore with regard to this line of testimony.

The Court: It may be received subject to the objection.

It is stipulated that should any of the original exhibits be desired by counsel introducing the same copies may be substituted and orig-

inals withdrawn from the files.

Mr. White: We now wish to offer in evidence the documents referred to by Mr. Houpt. Plaintiff offers in evidence Exhibit "3", being a copy of the original which, with counsel's consent, I am offering in place of the original for the reason that I desire to use the original in other cases.

Mr. Spooner: Objected to on the same ground that we did to the introduction of Exhibit "2", and also on the ground, if it was not covered by that objection, that it is immaterial

and irrelevant.

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The Court: My ruling will be the same as it was on the admission

of Exhibit "2"

Mr. White: I also move the court for judgment upon the ground that the plaintiff has failed to establish a right of action in the first instance, or a defense to the facts proved by the defendant in pursuance of its answer in the second instance.

Motion denied. Exception.

Exhibits in case not printed except as follows, are on file with clerk.

DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "2."

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
WASHINGTON, October 13, 1914.

1, C. F. Hauke, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, do hereby certify that the papers hereto attached are true copies of the originals as the same appear of record in this office.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name, and caused the seal of this office to be affixed, on the day and year first

above written.

C. F. HAUKE, Acting Commissioner.

United States of America 1892 Office of Indian Affairs. 39 STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Becker, ss:

Jos. A. Morrison, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says that he is 36 years of age, and that he is now and for the 36 years last past has been a resident of the White Earth Reservation, in the State of Minnesota; that he is personally well acquainted with Me-gis-way-waish-kung or George Wah-we-yay-cumig who is the allottee of and the grantee named and described in Trust Patent No. 4254, covering the S. E. ¼ of S. E. ¼ of Sec. 32, Twp. 144, Rge. 41 and the Lot numbered 1, of Sec. 5, Twp. 143, Rge. 41, the same being his original allotment and that he is also the allot-ee of the grantee named in Trust Patent No. 2169, covering the N. E. ¼ of N. E. ¼, Sec. 25, Twp. 142, Rge. 39 and Lot 7, Section 2 Twp. 142, Rge. 39, the same being his additional allotment upon the White Earth Indian Reservation, in the State of Minnesota.

Affiant further says that he knows of his own personal knowledge that the aforesaid Me-gis-way-wais-kung or George Wah-we-yay-cumig is an adult mixed-blood Indian, being more than 21 years of age, and whose allotment is upon the White Earth Reservation, in

the State of Minnesota.

Affiant further possitively says that all the statements above made are true and correct, and that he bases the same upon his own personal acquaintance with the allot-ee above named and upon his own personal knowledge of his family history.

40 Further deponent sayeth not.

JOS. A. MORRISON.

In presence of W. A. DU KRIES. J. E. PERRUELT.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of May A. D. 1908.

J. E. PERRUELT, Notary Public, Becker Co., Minn.

10-13-14/H. K. W.

Affidavit as to the Status of Me Gis Way Waish Kung.

STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Becker, sa:

Wah we yay cumig and Nah wah she bik o quay of lawful age,

each being first duly sworn, say:

That affiants are well acquainted with Me gis way waish kung who is the identical Indian of the Chippewa Tribe of Indians residing on the White Earth Indian Reservation to whom a Trust Patent or other Patent containing restrictions upon alienation was issued for his original allotment No. 4254, covering the S. E. ¼ of S. E. ¼ of Sec. 32, Twp. 144, Rge. 41 and Lot 1, of Sec. 5, Twp.

14° Rge. 41, West of the 5th P. M., and that he has selected for his ac nal allotment the following described land situated in the County of Becker, State of Minnesota, to-wit: N. E. ¼ of N. E. ¼ of Sec. 25, Lot 7 of Sec. 2 in Twp. 142, Rge. 39, West of the 5th P. M., carried on the Additional Allotment Schedule as No. 2169.

Affiants further say that they are well acquainted with the family history of the said Me-gis-way-waish-kung, Wah-we-yay-cumig one of the affiants hereof being his natural —; that he, the said Me gis way waish kung, is twenty-two (22) years of age and is a mixed blood Indian whose allotment is within the White Earth Reservation, in the State of Minnesota.

Affiants further say that they are each residents of Becker County, State of Minnesota, and have been for the last 40 years, and are

members of the Chippewa Tribe of Indians.

WA WE YAY CUMIG. NAH WAH SHE BIK O QUAY.

Witness

GEORGE FOX. H. S. DAHLEN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April A. D. 1908.

H. S. DAHLEN, County Auditor, Becker County, Minn.

10-WLB-13.

FLANDREAU, S. DAK., April 24th, 1908.

Supt. & Special Disbursing Agent, White Earth, Minn.

DEAR SIR: I hereby make application for a fee simple patent covering my original allotment described as follows: S. E. ¼ of S. E. ¼, Section 32, township 144, Range 41, and Lot 1, section 5, township

143, range 41, also for my additional allotment described as 42 follows: Lot 7, section 2, Township 142, range 39 and the N. E. ¼ of N. E. ¼, section 25, township 142, of range 39, all west of the fifth principal Meridian, in Minnesota.

10-IMH-13-14.

ME GIS WAY WAISH KUNG. GEORGE WAH WE YAY CUMIG.

A ffidavit.

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, County of Moody, sa:

Me-gis-way-waish-kung, or George Wah-we-yay-cumig, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the identical person named in trust patent No. 4254 and the grantee therein; that the land covered in said trust patent is described as follows: South east — of S. E. of Sec. 32, T. 144, R. 41, and Lot 1, Sec. 5, T. 143, R. 41. That the same was selected by him as his original allotment. That he

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is also the owner and person named in Trust Patent No. 2169, and the grantee named therein, covering the following described land, lot 7, of Sec. 2, and the N. E. 1/4 of N. E. — of Sec. 25 T. 142, R. 39, all being situated upon the White Earth Reservation in the State of Minnesota.

Deponent further says that he is a mixed blood Chippewa Indian belonging upon the White Earth Reservation, and a member of the

Mille-Lac band of Chippewas.

That he is more than 22 years of age, and an allot-ee of the White Earth Reservation.

> ME-GIS-WAY-WAISH-KUNG. GEORGE WAH-WE-YAY-CUMIG.

Witness:

WARREN G. COWLES. GEO. FOX.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of April Λ . D. 1908.

WARREN G. COWLES, Notary Public, Moody Co., So. Dak.

My commission expires March 21, 1912.

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, County of Moody, 88:

George Fox, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says, that he understands and speaks the Chippewa Indian language fluently. That he read and carefully interpreted and explained to Me-gis-way-waish-kung, or George Wah-we-yay-cumig the contents of the foregoing affidavit, before he signed the same, and that he stated then and there that he fully understood its purport.

GEORGE FOX.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of April, A. D. 1908.

WARREN G. COWLES, Notary Public, Moody Co., S. D.

10WWW-13-14.

44 STATE OF MINNESSOTA, County of Becker, 88:

Stephen Caswell and Lewis Caswell of lawful age, each being first

duly sworn, say:

That affiants are well acquainted with Me-gis-way-waish-kung or George Wam-we-yay-cumig who is the identical Indian of the Chippewa Tribe or Band of Indians belonging upon the White Earth Indian Reservation, in the State of Minnesota, to whom a trust or other patent containing restriction upon alienation was issued for his original allotment No. 42544, covering the S. E. ¼ of the S. E. ¼

of Sec. 32, Twp. 144, Rge. 41 and Lot 1, of Sec. 5, Twp. 143, Rge. 41. West of the 5th P. M., and that he has selected for his additional allotment the following described land situated in the County of Becker, State of Minnesota, to-wit: N. E. ¼ of N. E. ¼ of Sec. 25, Twp. 142, Rge. 39 & Lot 7, of Sec. 2, Twp. 142, Rge. 39 West of the 5th P. M., in Minnesota.

Affiants further say that they are personally well acquainted with the family history of the said Me-gis-way-waish-kung or George Wah-we-yay-cumig, and that he is a mixed blood Chippewa Indian whose allotment is upon the White Earth Reservation, in Minnesota,

and that he is more than 22 years of age.

Affiants further say that they are each residents of that portion of the White Earth Reservation lying within the County of Becker, in the State of Minnesota, and that they have been for over 29 years last past, and are members of the Chippewa Tribe or Band of Indians residing upon said Reservation.

STEPHEN CASWELL. LEWIS CASWELL.

In Presence of— A. C. KNUDSON. W. A. LUFKINS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of May A. D. 1908.

J. E. PERRUELT, Notary Public, Becker C., Minn.

Expires Dec. 16, 1914. B. S.-10-13-14.

101765–08. 33129 –08 I. O. 4254 & 2169.

The United States of America to all to Whom These Presents shall Come, Greeting:

Whereas, there has been deposited in the General Land Office of the United States an order of the Secretary of the Interior directing that fee simple patent issue to Me-gis-way-waish-kung, a Chippewa Indian, for the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section Thirty-two, in Township One Hundred Forty-four North, and the Lot One of Section Five in Township One Hundred Forty-three North of Range Forty-one West, and the Lot Seven of Section Two and the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section

Twenty-five in Township One Hundred Forty-two North of Range Thirty-nine west of the Fifth Principal Meredian, Minnesota, containing one hundred fifty-six and ninety-three hundredths acres.

Know Ye Now, that the United States of America, in consideration of the premises, has given and granted, and by these presents does give and grant, unto the said Me-gis-way-waish-kung, and to his heirs, the lands above described. To Have and to Hold the Same, together with all the rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances, of whatsoever nature thereunto belonging, unto the said Me-gis-way-waish-kung, and to his heirs and assigns forever.

In Testimony Whereof, I, Thoedore Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal of the General Land Office to be hereunto affixed. Given under my hand, at the City of Washington, the sixth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and—and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and eight.

By the President, T. ROOSEVELT,

By W. M. YOUNG, Secretary. JOHN O'CONNELL,

Acting Recorder of the General Land Office.

[Seal of the United States General Land Office.]

203420. B. M. F. H. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL LAND OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 16, 1908.

I hereby certify that the annexed copy of Patent is a true and literal exemplification from the record in this office. In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name and caused the seal of this office to be affixed at the City of Washington the day and year above written.

[SEAL.]

JOHN O'CONNELL, Acting Recorder of the General Land Office.

Filed for record the 16th day of November, A. D. 1908, at 11 o'clock A. M. and recorded in Book 34 of Deeds, page 235.

PHILLIP S. CONVERSE,

Register of Deeds.

4-207.

460650 "B" R. G. D. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL LAND OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D. C., Oct. 16, 1914.

I hereby certify that the annexed copies of letter and record of patent, are true and literal exemplifications from the original letter and record of patent on file in this office.

In Testimony Whereof I have hereunto subscribed my name and caused the seal of this office to be affixed, at the city of Washington,

on the day and year above written.

[United States General Land Office Seal.]

D. K. PARROTT,
Acting Assistant Commissioner
of the General Land Office.

6-3451

460650-1

Refer in Reply to the Following:

Land 33129-1908 E. S. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
WASHINGTON, May 23, 1908.
A. G. E.

Subject: Application for Patent in fee simple.

The Honorable The Secretary of the Interior.

SIR: Under date of May 14, 1908, the Unted States Indian Agent, White Earth Agency, Minnesota, forwarded the application of Megis-way-waish-kung for a patent in fee simple to his original and additional allotments described as follows:

Received May 26, 1908.

[SEAL.]

f

G. L. O.

Additional allotment, No. 2169: The Lot numbered 7 of Sec. 2 and the N. E. 1/4 of the N. E. 1/4 of Sec. 25 in Township 142 North of Range 39 West of the 5th P. M. Minnesota, containing 77 acres.

Original allotment, No. 4254: The S. E. 1/4 of the S. E. 1/4 of Sec. 32 in Township 144 North, and the Lot numbered 1 of Section 5 in Township 143 North of Range 41 West of the 5th

49 P. M. in Minnesota, containing 79.93 acres,

The application is based on the Act of June 21, 1906 (34 Stat. L., 325). The report shows that the applicant is a mixed blood and entitled to a patent in fee.

460650-2

It is therefore recommended that you cause the Commissioner of the General Land Office to issue a patent in fee simple to the allottee for the land described in the inclosed trust patents. When issued it should be sent to this office for delivery.

Very Respectfully,

C. H. FARRELL, Acting Commissioner.

May 25, 1908.

Approved and referred to the Commissioner of the General Land Office for action in accordance with the foregoing recommendation.

J. E. WILSON,

Assistant Secretary.

(Record of Patents.)

The United States of America, 2169. To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

Whereas, There has been deposited in the General Land Office of the United States a schedule of allotments approved by the Secretary of the Interior September 13, 1907, whereby it appears that Me Gis Way Waish Kung, an Indian of the Mille Lac Chippewa tribe or band, has been allotted the following-described 50 land:

The Lot Seven of Section two and the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of Section twenty-five in Township one hundred forty-two north of Range thirty-nine west of the Fifth Principal Meridian, Minnesota, containing seventy-seven acres:

Fee Patent Issued-08-101765.

Now Know Ye, That the United States of America, in consideration of the premises, has allot-ed, and by these presents does allot, unto the said Me gis way wiash kung the land above described, and hereby declares that it does and will hold the land thus allotted (subject to all statutory provisions and restriction) for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the said Me gis way waish kung or in case of his decease, for the sole use of his heirs, according to the law of the State or Territory where such land is located, and that at the expiration of said period the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian, or his heirs, as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever: Provided, That the President of the United States may, in his discretion, extend the said period.

In Testimony Whereof, I, Theodore Roosevelt, the President of the United States of America, have caused these letters to be made Patent, and the seal of the General Land Office to be hereunto affixed. 460650. Given under my hand, at the city of Washington,

the sixth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eight, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and thirty-second.

By the President: THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
[SEAL.] By M. W. YOUNG, Secretary.

H. W. LANFAD,
Recorder of the General Land Office.

6–1078

(Title of Cause.)

Stipulation for Settlement of Case.

It is hereby stipulated that the foregoing proposed case consisting of one hundred ten (110) pages of typewritten matter, 22 exhibits and copies of records may be taken as conformable to the truth and as containing all the evidence offered or introduced on trial of this cause, and all objections, ruling, orders and all other proceedings of such trial, and the same may be settled and allowed as a settled case by Hon. W. L. Parsons without notice.

Dated July 23rd, 1915.

MARSHALL A. SPOONER and FRED DENNIS,

CLYDE R. WHITE,

Attorney for Defendants.

(Title of Cause.)

Certificate of Settlement of Case.

I hereby certify that the foregoing case consisting of one hundred ten pages of typewritten matter, 22 exhibits and copies of 52 records, has been examined by me and found conformable by truth and to contain all the evidence offered or introduced on the trial of this cause, and also all the objections, rulings, orders and all other proceedings of such trial, and I hereby settle and allow same as settled case herein.

Dated July 28, 1915.

WILLIAM L. PARSONS, Judge.

(Title of Cause.)

Notice of Motion for Amendment of Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment or for a New Trial

You will please take notice, that — the settled case herein, the defendant F. A. Dickson, will move the above named court in its chambers in the court house in the city of Fergus Falls, Otter Tail county, Minnesota, on Wednesday, the 28th day of July, A. D. 1915, at ten o'clock A. M. or as soon thereafter as the counsel can be heard, for an order, amending the conclusions of law and order for judgment herein, with costs, on the ground that they are not justified by the findings of fact, for the reason, among others that a third finding of fact to the effect that Me-gis-way-waish-kung was born in April or May, 1889, is a finding of fact upon a question not in the issue in this case, in that, under the constitution and laws of the United States, the patent issued to the said Me-gis-way-

waish-kung and in evidence in this case is conclusive on the question of said Indian's age, in so - that the conclusion of

law will read as follows, to-wit:

"1. That defendant F. A. Dickson is the owner in fee of above

described premises.

2. That neither plaintiff nor any other of the defendants has any right, title, estate or interest in or lien on said lands and said premises.

3. That defendant F. A. Dickson is entitled to recover the costs and disbursements of this action to be taxed. Let judgment be entered accordingly,"

and, if that is denied then for an order vacating the decision of the court herein and granting a new trial, with costs, on the following

1. That the decision is not justified by the evidence and is con-

trary to law.

2. That the following findings of fact are without the issues, namely, the finding, "That said Me-gis-way-waish-kung was born in April or May, 1889."

3. Errors of law occurring at the trial and duly excepted to at the time.

CHARLES C. HAUPT,
507-508 Commerce Building,
St. Paul, Minnesota;
CLYDE R. WHITE,
314 Minnesota Loan & Trust Bldg.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota,
Attorneys for Defendant F. A. Dickson.

To Fred Dennis, Esq., Detroit, Minnesota, and Marshall A. Spooner, Esq., Bemidji, Minnesota, attorneys for plaintiff.

54

(Title of Cause.)

Order Denying Defendant Dickson's Motion to the Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment or for a New Trial.

A motion for an order amending the conclusions of law and the order for judgment herein, with costs, or if that were denied for an order vacating the decision of the court herein and granting a new trial, with costs, having been made by the defendant F. A. Dickson, Messrs. Charles C. Haupt, Esq., and Clyde R. White, Esq., appearing for the defendant Dickson, and Messrs. Marshall A. Spooner, Esq., and Fred Dennis, Esq., appearing for the plaintiff, in opposition to the said motion,

It is ordered that the said motion be and the same is hereby wholly denied both as to the amendment of the conclusions of law and order for judgment herein and as to the order vacating the decision herein and granting a new trial.

Dated July 28, 1915.

WILLIAM L. PARSONS, Judye.

Stay of 20 days is hereby granted.

WILLIAM L. PARSONS, Judge.

55

(Title of Cause.)

Notice of Appeal to Supreme Court.

To Fred Dennis and Marshall A. Spooner, attorneys for the plaintiff:

Take notice, that the defendant F. A. Dickson, appeals to the Supreme Court from the order in the above entitled action, made and entered on the 28th day of July, 1915, denying defendants' motion in the alternative for an order, amending the conclusions of law and the order for judgment herein, with costs, or for an order vacating

the decision of the court herein, and granting a new trial, with costs.

Dated August 14, 1915.

CLYDE R. WHITE,
314 Minn. Loan & Trust Bldg., Minneapolis, Minn.;
CHARLES C. HOUPT,
507-508 Commerce Building, St. Paul, Minn.,
Attorneys for Defendant, F. A. Dickson.

(Endorsed:) Due service of the within notice of appeal, upon us, at the City of Detroit, Minnesota, this 17th day of August, 1915, is hereby admitted. Fred Dennies, M. A. Spooner, Attorneys for plaintiff. Due service of the within notice of appeal, admitted this 19th day of August, 1915. J. L. Ketten, Clerk of District Court. Filed Aug. 19, 1915. J. L. Ketten, Clerk of District Court.

56 STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Becker:

In District Court, Seventh Judicial District.

LUCK LAND COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff,

C. J. MINOR, F. A. DICKSON, and R. L. SMITH; Also All Other Persons Unknown Claiming Any Right, Title, Estate, Interest, or Lien, in the Real Estate Described in the Complaint Herein, Defendants.

Bond for Stay on Appeal to Supreme Court.

Know all men by these presents, that we, F. A. Dickson, as principal, and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company as surety, are bound unto the Luck Land Company, a corporation, the defendant in the above entitled action, in the sum of two hundred fifty (\$250.00) dollars, for the payment of which to the said Luck Land Company, its successor and assigns, we jointly and severally bind ourselves our successors our executors our administrators.

The Condition of this obligation is such that whereas the defendant F. A. Dickson in the above entitled action has appealed to the Supreme Court, from an order filed in said action on the 28th day of July, 1915, denying said defendant's motion in the alternative for an order amending the conclusions of law and order for judgment herein, with costs, or for an order vacating the decision of the

court herein, and granting a new trail, with costs.

Now, therefore, if the defendant shall pay the costs of said appeal, and the damages sustained by respondent in consequence thereof, if said order, or any part thereof is affirmed, or said appeal dismissed, and abide and satisfy the judgment or order which the Appellate Court may give therein, then this obligation, which is given in pursuance of the General Statutes of 1913, Section 8003, shall be void; otherwise shall remain in full force.

In testimony whereof, we have unto set our hands and seals, this day of August, 1915.

F. A. DICKSON.

In presence of CLYDE R. WHITE. IDA LEHAM.

57 B. W. SCALLEN. L. O'DONNELL.

> UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, By WIRT WILSON,

GEORGE E. MURPHY,

Its Attorney-in-Fact.

(Corporate Seal.)

STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Hennepin, 88:

On this 27th day of August, 1915, before me a Notary Public within and for said county, personally appeared F. A. Dickson, to me known to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the same as his free act and deed.

[NOTABIAL SEAL.]

ALEX. L. GRANT, Notary Public, Hennepin County, Minn.

My commission expires Sept. 9th, 1921.

STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Hennepin, 88:

On this 27th day of August, 1915, before me a Notary Public within and for said County and State, personally appeared Wirt Wilson and George E. Murphy, to me personally known who being by me duly sworn upon oath did say that they are the Agents and Attorneys in Fact of and for the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, a corporation of Baltimore, Maryland, created, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Maryland; that the corporate seal affixed to the foregoing within instrument is the seal of said Company; that the said seal was affixed and said instrument was executed by authority of its Board of Directors; and the said Wirt Wilson and George E. Murphy did acknowledge that they executed the said instrument as the free act and deed of said Company.

[NOTARIAL SEAL.] BLANCHE W. SCALLEN, Notary Public, Hennepin County, Minn.

My commission expires Feb. 1, 1916.

(Endorsed:) I hereby approve the within Bond and the surety thereon. Dated August 30, 1915. William L. Parsons, Judge. Filed Aug. 31, 1915. J. L. Ketten, Clerk of District Court.

58 STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Becker, 88:

District Court, Seventh Judicial District.

I, J. L. Ketten, Clerk of the District Court, Becker County and State of Minnesota, do hereby certify and return to the Honorable the Supreme Court of said State, that I have compared the foregoing and attached paper writing with the original Notice and Bond on Appeal, together with the enforcements thereon, in the action therein entitled, now remaining of record in my office, and that the same is a true and correct copy and transcript of said originals and the whole thereof.

Witness my hand and seal of said Court, at the City of Detroit,

Minnesota, this 1st day of September, A. D. 1915.

[SEAL.] J. L. KETTEN, Clerk.

(Endorsed:) Filed Sep. 11, 1915. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

59 STATE OF MINNESOTA:

In Supreme Court, April 1916, Term.

Luck Land Company, a Corporation, Respondent, vs.
C. J. Minor et al., Defendants; F. A. Dickson, Appellant.

Assignments of Error.

I.

The trial court erred in permitting A. J. Powers, Wah-we-yah-cumig, Wah-way-she-bi-ko-quay and C. M. Johnson and others to testify over defendant Dickson's objection that the Indian Me-gis-way-waish-kung or George Wah-we-yea-cumig was born in April or May, 1889 (P. B., ff. 100a-100f and 107-108) for the reason that the age or minority of said Indian was not within the issues of said action.

60 II.

The trial court erred in denying defendant Dickson motion for judgment made at the close of all the testimony (P. B., f. 112), for the reason that the evidence at that time, since the Indian's age was not in issue properly, showed title to the lands involved was in the defendant Dickson.

III.

The trial court erred in including in its findings of fact, the findings, "That the said Me-gis-way-waish-kung was born in April or May, 1889" (P. B., f. 22), for the reason that such finding was and is outside of the issues in this action.

IV

The trial court erred in finding as a conclusion of law, "That plaintiff is the owner in fee of the above described lands" (P. B., f. 29), for the reason that said conclusion of law is not justified or sustained by the findings of fact, unless the findings of fact as to the Indian's age is a proper issue in this case, which the appellant denies.

V.

The trial court erred in finding as a conclusion of law "That no one of the defendants has any estate or interest in said premises or any lien thereon" (P. B., f. 28), for the reason that such conclusion of law is not justified or sustained by the findings of fact, unless the finding of fact above noted as to the Indian's age or minority is a proper and legitimate issue in this case, which appellant denies.

VI.

The trial court erred in finding as a conclusion of law "That plaintiff is entitled to recover the costs and disbursements of this action to be taxed" (P. B., f. 29), for the reason that the same is not sustained or justified by the findings of fact nor by the previous conclusions of law, upon which it must rest unless the court's finding of fact as to the Indian's age was a proper and legitimate issue in this case, which appellant denies.

VII.

The trial court erred in ordering judgment according to the forgoing conclusions of law (P. B., f. 29), that is for the plaintiff, for the reason that said order for judgment is not authorized or sutained by the conclusions of law or findings of fact herein, since the question of the Indian's minority was not properly within the issues of this case.

VIII.

The trial court erred in denying the defendant Dickson's motion for an order amending the conclusions of law and the order for judgment, so that they would read as in folio 157 of the printed 62 Record (P. B., ff. 155-159 and 160-162) for the reason that the question of the Indian's age or minority was not within the issues of this case and without such finding the conclusions of

law and order for judgment are not sustained or justified by either the evidence or the finding of fact and should have been amended as requested.

IX.

The trial court erred in denying defendant Dickson's motion for a new trial (P. B., ff. 155-159 and 160-162), for the following reasons: (1) That the decision of the court was not justified by the evidence since the issue of the Indian's age or minority was not properly before the court; (2) For the reason that the decision is contrary to law in that it proceeds and rests upon the assumption of law that the question of the Indian's age or minority was open to the determination of the court and that the determination of that issue was determinative of the rights of the parties to said action; (3) For the reason that the finding of fact, "That said Me-Gisway-waish-kung was born in April or May, 1880" was without the issues of the case; (4) For the reason that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of A. J. Powers, Way-we-yah-cunig, Nah-Wah-She-Bi-Ko-Quay and C. M. Johnston and others to the effect that said Indian, Me-gis-way-waish-kung or George-Wan-We-Yea-Cumig was born in April or May, 1889 (P. B., ff. 100a-100f and 100-108).

CHARLES C. HAUPT,
1015 Merchants Natl. Bank Bldg.,
St. Paul, Minnouete.
CLYDE R. WHITE,
509-14 Minn. Loan & Trust Bldg.,
Minneapolis, Minnouete.
Attorneys for Appellient.

[Endorsed:] Filed Mar. 13, 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

63

LUCK LAND Co., Respondent,

C. J. MINOR et al, Defendants; F. A. DICKNON, Appellant,

Syllabus.

In issuing a patent to land in fee simple to a mixed blood Chippewa Indian of the White Earth Indian Reservation, the officials of the United States necessarily determined that the Indian was an adult. Such determination is conclusive as to the Indian's right to take and hold title, except in a direct action to set aside the patent.

The issuance of the patent, while in adjudication of the patence's right thereto, and of his title to the land, does not prevent the courts of this state from inquiring into the question of the Indian's age for the purpose of determining the validity of the conveyance from

him.

Under the federal statutes after a patent in fee is issued to an Indian questions as to the validity of his subsequent transfers of the land are controlled by the laws of the state.

Affirmed.

Opinion.

This is an action to determine adverse claims to certain real estate in Becker county. Plaintiff claims title to the property while defendant Dickson insists that the title is in him. Both claim under the Indian Me-gis-way-waish-kung. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff, and defendant Dickson appeals from an order denying his motion to amend the conclusions of law and order for judgment, or for a new trial.

The Indian is a mixed blood Chippewa of the White Earth Indian Reservation. The lands in controversy are within the reservation, and prior to April 24, 1908, were allotted to the Indian. On that day he applied for a patent to the lands in fee simple, and on August 6, 1908, this patent was issued by the United States to the Indian.

The patent was recorded in Becker County November 16, 1908. Defendant Dickson claims title under two deeds from the Indian, one made April 24, 1908, the other January 17, 1910. Plaintiff claims title under two subsequent deeds from the Indian, dated respectively. November 23, 1911, and July 2, 1912.

The trial court found as a fact that the Indian was born in April or May, 1889, and therefore was a minor at the time he gave the deeds under which defendant Dickson claims title. On the theory that the Indian had a right to avoid these deeds after he became of age, and did so when he gave the deeds under which plaintiff claims, it was held that plaintiff had the title. The finding as to the age of the Indian is not assailed as being against the evidence, nor does defendant question the result reached, if it can be held that it was open to prove that the Indian was a minor. The claim of defendant is that the United States, when it issued the patent, found that the Indian was an adult, and that this finding is conclusive. It is true that there was this finding, as the law required that the patentee be an adult. It is correct that the Indian's title could not be attacked on the ground that he was under age when the patent issued. patent is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee as against the government and all claiming under junior patents or titles until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal. Steele v. Smelling Co., 106 U. S. 447. Many other authorities might be cited to these propositions, but they are so well settled and undisputed that it is unnecessary.

But there is no case holding that the validity of transfers by the patentee may not be attacked by showing his incapacity, for minority or any other reason, to make a valid transfer. There is no case holding that the finding of the secretary of the Interior or the land department that the Indian is an adult settles this question for all purposes and for all times. It settles it conclusively in so far as the right of the Indian to take and hold title is concerned, but the department has not attempted to adjudicate the capacity of the Indian

to trapefor his title.

When the lands were conveyed to the Inidian by a patent in fee he

became the absolute owner, and his title was unassailable. 65 But in his further dealings with the property the laws of the state, not those of the federal government, control. act of Congress of February 8, 1837, (24 Stat. at Large 388), and the act of May 8, 1906, 34 Statutes at Large, 182, provided that when lands were conveyed to Indians by patent in fee, each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws of the state or territory in which they may reside. The Clapp Amendment of 1906 and 1907, 34 Statutes at Large, 325, 1015, provided "that all restrictions as to the sale, encumbrance or taxation of allotments within the White Earth Reservation heretofore or hereafter held by adult mixed blood Indians are hereby removed and the trust deeds heretofore or hereafter executed by the department for such allotments are hereby declared to pass title in fee simple." The suggestion that by the Clapp Amendment Congress intended to remove any restrictions as to the sale of their lands by Indians except those that the federal government had heretofore imposed is without There can be no doubt, both under the language of the Acts of February 8, 1887 and of May 8, 1906, and under the decisions, that the validity of sales or transfers by the Indian is a matter to be determined by the state law.

It follows that the courts of this state are not precluded from inquiring into the age of an Indian patentee for the purpose of determining the validity of a conveyance from him, or for any other purpose save to impeach his title to the land. The conclusion necessarily follows that the trial court was right in holding that the question of the Indian's age was open in this case, and the finding on that question not being attacked, the result reached by the trial court

was clearly correct.

Order affirmed.

BUNN, J.

(Endorsed:) Filed April 28, 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

66 State of Minnesota, Supreme Court, April Term, A. D. 1916,

No. 31.

LUCK LAND COMPANY, Respondent,

VR.

C. J. MINOR, et al., Defendants; F. A. DICKSON, Appellant.

Pursuant to an order of Court duly made and entered in this

cause April 28, A. D. 1916.

It is here and hereby determined and adjudged that the order of the Court below, herein appealed from, to-wit, of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, sitting within and for the County of Becker be and the same hereby is in all things affirmed.

And it is further determined and adjudged that the Respondent above named, do have and recover of said Appellant herein the sum and amount of Forty and 00/100 Pollars, \$40.00) costs and dis-

bursements in this cause in this Court, and that execution may be issued for the enforcement thereof.

Dated and signed May 16 A. D. 1916.

By the Court.

Attest:

I. A. CASWELL, Clerk.

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Statement for Judgment.

Statutory Costs, \$25.00. Printer, \$14.50. Clerk, \$—. Acknowledgments, \$.50. Return, \$—. Potage and Express, \$—. Filing Mandate, \$—. Total. \$40.00.

67 STATE OF MINNESOTA, Supreme Court, 88:

I, I. A. Caswell, Clerk of said Supreme Court, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full and true copy of the Entry of Judgment in the cause therein entitled, as appears from the original remaining of record in my office; that I have carefully compared the within copy with said original and that the same is a correct transcript therefrom.

Witness my hand and seal of said Supreme Court at the Capitol, in the City of St. Paul, May 16 A. D. 1916.

[SEAL.] I. A. CASWELL, Clerk.

STATE OF MINNESOTA, Supreme Court:

Transcript of Judgment.

Filed May 16, A. D. 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

(Endorsed:) Judgment Roll. Filed May 16, 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

68 STATE OF MINNESOTA, Supreme Court, ss:

I, I. A. Caswell, Clerk of said court, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete transcript of the record and proceedings in the case of Luck Land Company, Respondent, vs. C. J. Minor, et al., Defendants, F. A. Dickson, Appellant, and also of the opinion of the court rendered therein together with the assignment of errors, as the same now appear on file in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at my office, in St. Paul, Minnesota, this 29th

day of June, 1916.

[Seal of the Supreme Court, State of Minnesota.]

I. A. CASWELL, Clerk Supreme Court of Minnesota. 69 STATE OF MINNESOTA, Supreme Court:

LUCK LAND COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,

C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson and R. L. Smith; Also All Other Persons Unknown Claiming Any Right, Title, Estate, Interest, or Lien in the Real Estate Described in the Complainant Herein, Defendants; and F. A. Dickson, Defendant and Appellant.

Assignments of Error by Appellant F. A. Dickson, Presented and Filed with the Petition for Writ of Error from the United States Supreme Court to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.

The said Petitioner, F. A. Dickson, Plaintiff in Error for Writ of Error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, in the above entitled proceedings, by Frank Healy, and Charles C. Haupt and Clyde R. White, his attorneys, at the same time with the presenting and filing of his petition for writ of error in the above entitled proceedings, states that in the record, proceedings, decision and final judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, in the above entitled matter, there are manifest errors, in this,

I.

In said suit or proceedings in the Supreme Court of Minnesota there was drawn in question, as more fully shown in and by the record therein, the validity of the hereinafter designated and enumerated statutes of the United States, and the validity of the authorities exercised under the United States by the Secretary of the Interior,

his subordinates, bureaus and departments, in and about 70 the issuing of the fee simple patent to the lands in said suit involved, and the decision and judgment of said Supreme Court of Minnesota were against the validity of such statutes and authorities and in favor of the validity of the statutes of the state of Minnesota, in this, that under and by virtue of such statutes and authorities of the United States the Indian to whom the lands involved in this suit were patented in fee, and through whom by subsequent mesne conveyances the plaintiff in error claims to have become the owner in fee of said lands, became and was, after the issuance of said fee simple patent, possessed of the absolute and unrestiricted right and privilege to sell, incumber and convey said lands, the constitution of the State of Minnesota and its statutes and laws defining the age at which one becomes an adult and making conveyances executed by minors voidbale at their option within a reasonable time after they attain their majority, to the contrary notwithstanding; and said decision and judgment by holding, as it did, that the aforesaid statutes and laws of the State of Minnesota, and not the aforesaid statutes of the United States and the aforesaid authorities exercised under them, governed, controlled, and regulated the conveyance of said land by said Indian after he secured patent in fee thereto, and by holding that under said statutes of the state of Minnesota the conveyance of said lands made by said Indian to the predecessors in interest and the grantors of plaintiff in error were voidable and were avoided by the later conveyances which said Indian made after attaining his actual majority to the defendant in error and its predecessors in interest and grantors, and that therefore the defendant in error was the owner in fee of said lands, and that plaintiff in error had no right, title or estate in or to the same, denied to said statutes of and authorities exercised under the United States so much of their force and effect as plaintiff in error claims they possess in giving to said Indian the right to sell, incumber and convey said lands, and to that extent denied the validity of such statutes and authorities.

1 extent denied the validity of such statutes and authorities, in respect of all of which said Supreme Court of the State of

Minnesota erred.

II.

In said suit or proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota there was drawn in question the validity of those statutes of the state of Minnesota which define an adult to be a person who has attained the age of twenty-one years and which make deeds and conveyances executed by a minor voidable at his election within a reasonable time after he attains his majority; and such statutes were, as plaintiff in error contended and argued, in said suit and proceeding, repugnant to the statutes and laws of the United States, among others, the Act of Congress of February 8, 1887 (Statutes at Large 24-388) and the various acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto, and the Act of Congress of June 21, 1906 (34 Statutes at Large 325) as amended by the act of Congress of March 1, 1907 (34 Statutes at Large 1015), and the Act of Congress of May 8, 1906 (34 Statutes at Large 182) under and by virtue of all of which the Indian patentee of the lands involved in this suit had and possessed an absolute and unconditional right to sell, incumber and convey his said lands, the laws aforesaid of the State of Minnesota to the contrary notwithstanding; and in said suit or proceeding the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota decided and held, in substance, that the conveyances by said Indian patentee were regulated and controlled by the said statutes of the State of Minnesota and not by the federal statutes aforesaid, and that under such statutes of the State of Minnesota the conveyances by the said Indian to the predecessors in interest and grantors of plaintiff in error were voidable at the option of said Indian patentee and had been by him avoided by his subsequent conveyances to the

defendant in error and its predecessors in interest and grant72 ors; and in all of these respects, therefore, the aforesaid
judgment and decision of the Supreme Court of the State of
Minnesota was in favor of the validity of the said statutes of the
State of Minnesota and against the validity of the said statutes of

the United States, and was therefore erroneous.

III.

That said decision and judgment is, in substance and effect, against the rights, title and privileges of plaintiff in error in and to and about the lands involved in this action, which rights, title and privileges plaintiff in error claimed and asserted (1) under and by virtue of the Constitution of the United States, more particularly, (a) under Article VI. thereof which provides that "This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding", and (b) Section 3 of Article IV. which provides that "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States", and also (c) Section 8 of Article I. which provides that "The Congress shall have power to * * * with the Indian tribes", and (2) regulate commerce under the laws and statutes of the United States, more particularly, (a) the Act of Congress of February 8, 1887, chapter 119, (24 Statutes at Large 388) and the various acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto, (b) the Act of Congress of June 21, 1906, (34 Statutes at Large 325), as amended by the Act of Congress of March 1, 1907 (34 Statutes at Large 1015), (c) the Act of Congress of May 8, 1906 (34 Statutes at Large 182) and (d) all other laws and statutes of the United States relating to, governing or affecting the matters in controversy in this suit, and (3) also under the commissions held and exercised by the Secretary of the Interior and his subordinates, bureaus and departments.

under the United States, in and about the issuance of the fee simple patent to the Indian, as more fully shown by the records and proceedings in this case, which rights, title and privileges plaintiff in error, throughout the proceedings in the District and Supreme Courts of the State of Minnesota, specially set up and claimed under said constitution, statutes, commissions, and authorities; in this, that under and by virtue of the aforesaid constitution. statutes, commissions and authorities, the Indian to whom said lands were patented in fee and through whom plaintiff in error derived his rights, title and privileges in and to said lands, became and was, from and after the issuance of said fee simple patent to him, possessed of the absolute and unrestricted right to sell, incumber and convey said lands the constitution and laws of the State of Minnesota relating to conveyances of real estate by minors, to the contrary notwithstanding; in respect of all of which said Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota erred to the injury of the plaintiff in error.

IV.

The said Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota in said suit or proceeding erred in holding, deciding and adjudging that "The Issuance of a patent does not prevent the courts of this state from inquiring into the question of the Indian's age for the purpose of determining the validity of a conveyance by him," for the reason that under and by virtue of the constitution and statutes of the United States hereinbefore referred to and the commissions and authorities hereinbefore described, said Indian patentee while within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, by the lawful exercise of the powers and authorities of federal officers thereunder became seized and possessed of the right to sell, incumber and convey his said lands, which right he possessed as a citizen of the United States beyond the power or authority of any state to remove, abridge or restrict; and the holding decision and adjudica-

abridge or restrict; and the holding, decision and adjudication thus made, under the facts and circumstances of the case was against the title, rights and privilege of the plaintiff in error in and to and about the lands involved, all of which he specially set up and claimed under such constitution and statutes and under the commissions and authority exercised by the Secretary of the Interior and his subordinates under such constitution and statutes.

V.

The said Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota in said proceedings erred under the facts and circumstances of this case in holding, adjudging and deciding that "Under the federal statutes after a patent in fee is issued to an Indian, questions as to the validity of his subsequent transfers of the land are controlled by the laws of the state," for the reason that under the constitution and statutes of the United States and by virtue of their necessary force and effect the Indian in this case, while under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States was given and granted the absoluted and unconditional right to sell, encumber and convey the lands patented to him, and the necessary effect and consequence of such holding is to deprive plaintiff in error of his right, title and privileges in said lands which he specially set up and claimed in said suit under such constitution and statutes and the commissions and authorities exercised by the Secretary of the Interior and his subordinates, and said decision is therefore against such rights, title and privileges of the plaintiff in error.

VI.

The Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota in said proceedings, under the facts and circumstances thereof, erred in holding, deciding and adjudging "It (the patent) settles it conclusively in so far as the right of the Indian to take and hold title is concerned, but the department has not attempted to adjudicate the capacity of the Indian to transfer his title," for the reason that under the constitution and statutes of the United States and the commissions and authorities exercised by the Secretary of the Interior and his subordinates thereunder, the determination of such department that the Indian was entitled to a fee simple patent was necessarily a determination and adjudication that all restrictions as to the sale, incumbrance or conveyance of such lands were removed and the

Indian patentee was thereafter entitled to sell, incumber and convey them; and hence the decision in question was against the right, interest and privilege of the plaintiff in error in and to the lands involved, which rights he specially set up and claimed in said action under and by virtue of the constitution, statutes, commissions and authorities aforesaid.

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The Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota in said proceedings, under the facts and circumstances of the case, erred in holding, deciding and adjudging "When the lands were conveyed to the Indian by a patent in fee, he became the absolute owner, and his title was But in his further dealings with the property the laws of the state, not those of the federal government, controlled. Act of Congress of February 8, 1887, (24 Stat. L. 388) and the Act of May 8, 1906, (34 Stat. L. 182) provided that when lands were conveyed to Indians by patent in fee, each and every allottee shall have the subject of and be subject to the laws of the state or territory in which he may reside. The Clapp Amendment of 1906 and 1907 (34 Statutes at Large 325, 1015) provided that 'all restrictions as to the sale, incumbrance and taxation of allotments within the White Earth Reservation heretofore or hereafter held by adult mixed blood Indians are hereby removed and the trust deeds heretofore or hereafter executed by the department for such allotments are hereby declared to pass title in fee simple.' The suggestion that by the Clapp Amendment Congress intended to remove any restrictions as to the sale of their lands by Indians except those that the

76 federal government had heretofore imposed is without merit, There can be no doubt, both under the language of the acts of February 8, 1887 and May 8, 1906, and under the decisions, that the validity of sales or transfers by the Indian is a matter to be determined by the state law,"-for the reason that under the constitution and statutes of the United States and the commissions and authorities exercised under them by the Secretary of the Interior and his subordinates in and about the issuance of fee simple patent to the Indian, the Indian in this case by the determination of such officials and by his patent to these lands became seized and possessed of the absolute and unconditional right to sell, convey and incumber them, and by such statutes became and was a citizen of the United States, entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of such citizens. "without in any manner impairing or otherwise affecting the right of any such Indian to tribal or other property"; and hence the decision aforesaid was against the right, interest and privilege of the plaintiff in error in and to the lands involved herein, which right he specially set up and claimed in said action under and by virtue of the constitution, statutes, commissions and authorities aforesaid.

Wherefore, the said plaintiff in error prays that the said judgment and decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota be reversed and annulled, and that said plaintiff in error may be restored to all things that he has lost by reason of such judgment, and that

judgment be rendered in favor of said plaintiff in error and against said defendant in error.

Dated June 16th, 1916.

FRANK HEALY,
519 Metropolitan Life Bldg.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota;
CHARLES C. HAUPT,
1015 Merchant's Nat'l B'k Bldg.,
St. Paul, Minnesota;
CLYDE R. WHITE,
509-514 Minn. Loan & Trust Bldg.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.

76½ (Endorsed:) Original. 19539. State of Minnesota, Supreme Court. Luck Land Company, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson and R. L. Smith; also all other persons claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the real estate described in the complaint herein, Defendants; and F. A. Dickson, Defendant and Appellant. Assignments of Error by Appellant. Due personal service of the within Assignments of Error by Appellant upon me this 22 day of June, 1916, is hereby admitted. Marshall A. Spooner, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. Charles C. Haupt, 1015 Merchants' Nat'l Bank Bldg., St. Paul, Minnesota, Clyde R. White, 509-14 Minn. Loan & Trust Bldg., Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Frank Healy, 519 Met. Life Bldg., Minneapolis, Minn., Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error. Filed Jun- 24, 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

77 STATE OF MINNESOTA, Supreme Court:

LUCK LAND COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,

C. J. MINOR, F. A. DICKSON and R. L. SMITH; Also all Other Persons Unknown Claiming any Right, Title, Estate, Interest or Lien in the Lands Described in the Complaint Herein, Defendants, and F. A. Dickson, Defendant and Appellant.

Petition by the Appellant, F. A. Dickson, for Allowance of Writ of Error in Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.

To the Honorable Calvin L. Brown, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the State of Minnesota:

The petition of F. A. Dickson, respectfully shows that in the above entitled proceedings on the 16th day of May 1916 a final judgment and decree was entered in the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, a tribunal having jurisdiction under the laws of the State of Minnesota to render final judgments in all proceedings of such nature and the highest Court or tribunal in said State in which a decision in said suit could be had; and in said proceedings said Luck

Land Company was plaintiff and respondent and your petitioner was

defendant and appellant.

Your petitioner further shows that in May 1914, an action was commenced in the District Court of Becker County, Minnesota, by said Luck Land Company against your petitioner and C. J. Minor and R. L. Smith and also all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the lands described in the complaint therein and in the complaint in said action it was alleged in substance that said Luck Land Company was the owner in fee of

Lot seven (7) of Section two (2) and the Northwest quarter (N. W. 1/4) of the Northeast quarter (N. E. 1/4) of Section 78 twenty-five (25), all in Township one hundred forty-two (142) North of Range thirty-nine (39) West and all in Becker County, Minnesota; that said lands were vacant and unoccupied and that defendant claimed an estate or interest in said lands adverse to the said plaintiff; and the plaintiff prayed that it might be adjudged to be the owner in fee of said premises and that defendants had no estate or interest therein. Each of the named defendants answered separately and admitted that plaintiff was a corporation and the lands described were vacant, but denied all the other allegations of the complaint. Thereafter issues were joined, the cause placed upon the Calendar and on October 17th, 1914, the same was tried by the Court without a Jury. Upon the trial, the defendant, C. J. Minor, failed to appear and was defaulted. Prior to the trial, defendant R. L. Smith quit-claimed all of his interest, estate in the lands to your petitioner and this fact your petitioner by leave of the trial court set up by Supplemental Answer on the trial. ant R. L. Smith did not appear upon the trial and was also defaulted. The trial court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered judgment for the plaintiff accordingly.

From the evidence and findings of fact in said case, it appeared, among other things, that the lands above described were a part of the White Earth Indian Reservation in the State of Minnesota; that Me-Gis-Way-Waish-Kung or George Wah-We-Yea-Cumig, hereinafter called the Indian, was a mixed blood Chippewa Indian of the White Earth Indian Reservation; that on September 13th, 1907, said lands were duly allotted to the Indian under and pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Congress of February 8th, 1887, Chapter 119 (24 Stat. L. 388) and subsequent amendments thereof and supplements thereto; that on February 6th, 1908, a trust patent to said lands was duly issued pursuant to the above Act and the then existing laws relating to and governing the subject matter thereof, to the Indian

by the general land office of the United States upon the recommendation and approval of the Secretary of the Interior and the acting commissioner of the office of Indian affairs, by the terms of which the United States agreed to hold said lands in trust for the Indian and his heirs for a period of twenty-five (25) years; that in April 1908, the Indian made due application under and pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 21, 1906 (34 Stat. L. 325) as amended by the Act of Congress of March 1st, 1907 (34 Stat. L. 1015), the so-called Clapp Amendment, to the Superintendent and Special Disbursing Agent at White Earth, Min-

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nesota, for a fee simple patent to said lands, and accompanied his application with his own affidavit and those of five other persons, reciting in substance that he was then an adult mixed blood Chippewa Indian of White Earth Reservation; that this application was duly forwarded by said agent to the Secretary of the Interior and such proceedings were thereafter had and taken that issuance of a fee simple patent was recommended and on August 6th, 1908 a fee simple patent to said lands was duly issued by the general land office

of the United States to the Indian.

At the trial, defendant introduced no evidence of the Indian's age and the trial court found against petitioner's objection as a fact that the Indian became of age in April or May 1910. Prior to May 1910, the Indian made two conveyances of these lands by Warranty Deeds, one to A. C. Knudson and the other to Louis C. Carpenter. sequent mesne conveyances, the interests and estates of Knudson and Carpenter were conveyed to and lodged in your petitioner. quently to May 1910, the Indian made two other conveyances of these lands by Warranty Deeds, the rights under which, if any, were subsequently vested by mesne conveyances in the plaintiff, Luck Land Company, and upon the trial, plaintiff introduced the fee simple patent in evidence and relied upon it. Upon the trial of said action in the District Court, your petitioner objected to the introduction of evidence tending to prove the minority of the Indian at the

time of the two first named conveyances by him, and at the close of all the evidence moved for judgment in his own behalf, which objection and motions were made upon the grounds and for the reasons hereinafter set forth, why the age of

said Indian was not in issue in said action.

After the filing of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court, your petitioner duly moved the court for an order amending its conclusions of law and its order for judgment or if that should be denied, then for a new trial upon the grounds and for the reasons more fully set forth and shown in the record herein, and in this petition hereinafter, but among others, that the finding of fact that the Indian was born in April or May 1889 was a finding upon a fact not in issue in the case, because under the Constitution and Laws of the United States and the commissions and authorities exercised by the officers of the United States under said Statutes and Constitution, the patent issued to said Indian was conclusive upon that question. Petitioner's motion was denied in all respects and from the order denying the same, petitioner duly appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, which on the date aforesaid affirmed the order In said Supreme Court the sole and only legal of the trial court. question argued and submitted was the right of plaintiff under the Constitution and Statutes of the United States to raise the question of the Indian's age or minority in said action, and this question was there argued and contested in all respects and upon all grounds shown in this petition and in the Assignment of Errors filed herewith.

Your petitioner further shows that by the Act of February 8th, 1887, supra, it was provided, among other things, that "if any conveyances shall be made of the lands set apart and allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching the same, before the expiration of the time (25 years) above mentioned, such conveyance shall be absolutely null and void"; and by the Act of June 21, 1906, supra, it was provided, that "all restrictions as to the sale, incumbrance or taxation for allotments within the White Earth Reservation in the State of Minnesota, heretofore or hereafter held by adult

mixed blood Indians, are hereby removed, and the trust deeds heretofore or hereafter executed by the department for such allotments are hereby declared to pass the title in fee simple, or such mixed bloods upon application shall be entitled to receive patent in fee simple for such allotments"; and that by the Act of May 8th, 1906, supra, it was provided, among other things, that "until the issuance of fee simple patents, all allottees to whom trust patents shall hereafter be issued shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the

United States." (34 Stat. L. 182).

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Your petitioner further shows that throughout the trial of said cause in the said District Court and in the said Supreme Court of Minnesota, he made the following claims and contentions, among others,-that by virtue of the Constitution of the United States and its Statutes, and in particular, the hereinbefore referred to Statutes of the United States, the Indian was within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States until fee simple patent had been issued to him; that during that time there were and could be no restrictions upon his right to sell or convey or encumber said land, except such as the Government of the United States imposed; that in proceedings for the issuance of fee simple patent to him, the proper officers, under the so-called Clapp Amendment and the other Statutes relating to this subject, necessarily found and determined that the Indian was at the date of the issuance of such patent an adult mixed blood Indian Allottee of the White Earth Reservation in the State of Minnesota; that by virtue of that patent and the laws and Constitution of the United States, the Indian was necessarily vested with both the fee simple title to said lands and the absolute and unconditioned right to sell, encumber and convey the same; that this right was not contingent upon nor subject to the laws of the State of Minnesota in regard to conveyances by minors, and that the State of Minnesota was without power or authority to take away, alter, modify or condition the right of sale, encumbrance and conveyance thus conferred upon the Indian by the laws and Constitution of the United States that under the Constitution and laws of the United

States, said fee simple patent was a quasi-judicial determination of the Indian's age as well as a muniment of title and was conclusive and unimpeachable evidence upon that question, and was not subject to collateral attack, and that therefore, the question of the Indian's age was not in issue in said action: that, therefore, said fee simple patent was conclusive evidence that the Indian at the date of its issuance to him was an adult; that by reason of such Constitution and the laws of the United States, your petitioner in purchasing said land had the legal right and privilege to rely upon said patent as a conclusive and final determination that the Indian was an adult at the date of the issuance and was privileged not to inquire by

parol as to said Indian's age; that by reason of the force and effect of said Constitution and Statutes, the title to said lands passed from the Indian to his immediate grantee and from them by mesne conveyances to your petitioner; that the conveyances subsequent to May 1910 did not transmit any title or estate to the grantee therein named for the reason that the Indian then had nothing to convey, and that the position taken by the plaintiff and by it contended for, was in contravention of numerous articles of the Constitution of the United States, among others, Article VI, which provides that "This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof. * * * shall be the supreme law of the land: and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding". And also Section 3 of Article 4 of said Constitution providing that "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States"; and also Section 8 of Article 1. which provides that "The Congress shall have power to regulate comwith the Indian tribes."

And finally your petitioner shows that in said suit or proceeding in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, there was drawn in questions of the United States.

tion the validity of the aforesaid Statutes of the United States. 83 and the validity of the authorities exercised under the United States by the said Secretary of the Interior and his subordinates, and the decision of said Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota was against the validity of such Statute and authorities in this, that under and by virtue of such Statute and authority, the Indian Allottee in this case became and was seized and possessed of the right, title and privilege to sell, encumber and convey the lands involved in this suit, the laws and Constitution of the State of Minnesota to the contrary notwithstanding, and lawfully conveyed said lands to the grantors of the plaintiff in error, and the decision and determination of the Secretary of the Interior and his subordinates, including the land department of the United States was a quasi-judicial determine tion, that said Indian Allottee was not only entitled to a patent to such lands, but that he was lawfully entitled to sell, convey, encumber the same; that the decision of said Supreme Court of the United States restricts and confines the scope and effect of such Statutes by narrower limits than was the intention and purpose of Congress and pro tanto denies their validity, and it also restricts, confines and parrows the scope and effect of the determination of the Secretary of the Interior and his subordinates made pursuant to such Statute and to that extent denies to such determination the full validity, force and effect which Congress intended it should have.

And finally, your petitioner shows that in said suit or proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, there was drawn in question the validity of that Statutes of the State of Minnesota which defines an adult to be a person who has attained the age of twenty-one years, and which make deeds and conveyances executed by a minor voidable at his election, within reasonable time after he attains

his majority; and such Statutes were, as plaintiff in erver contended and argues, in said suit and proceeding, repugnant to the Statutes and laws of the United States, among others, the Act of Congress of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat. L. 388), and various acts amonds

tory thereof and supplementary thereto, and the Act of Con-84 grees of June 21, 1906, (34 Stat. L. 325) as amended by the Act of Congress of March 1st, 1907, (34 Stat. L. 1015) and the Act of Congress of May 8, 1906, (34 Stat. L. 182) under any by virtue of all of which the Indian patentee of the lands involved in this said had and possessed an absolute and unconditional right to sell, oncumber and convey his said lands, the laws aforesaid of the State of Minnesota to the contrary notwithstanding; and in said suit or proceeding, the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota decided and held in substance that the conveyance by said Indian patentee was regulated and controlled by the said Statutes of the State of Minne. sota and not by the Federal Statutes aforesaid, and that under such Statutes of the State of Minnesots, the conveyances by the said Indian to the predecessors in interest and grantors of the plaintiff in serve were voidable at the option of said Indian patentee and had been by him avoided by his subsequent conveyance to the defendant is error and its predecessors in interest and granture; and in all of these respects, therefore, the aforesaid judgment and decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota was in favor of the validity of said Statutes of the State of Minnesota and against the validity of said Statutes of the United States, and was, therefore, erronsous,

Wherefore, your petitioner prays that a Writ of Error be allowed, and that a transcript of record, proceedings and papers upon which said decree was rendered, duly authenticated, be ordered each to the Supreme Court of the United States at Washington, D. C. under the rules of such Court in such cases made and provided, and that the same may be by this Hoporable Court inspected and corrected in

accordance with the lew and justice.

PRANK HEALY,
519 Metropolition Life Bldg,
Minnoapolin, Minnoapolin,
CHARLES C. HAUPT,
1015 Merchante Not'l Benk Bldg,
St. Pend, Minnoapolin,
CLYDE R. WHITE,
500-14 Minn. Lann & Trust Bldg,
Minnoapolin, Minnoapolin,

Attorneys for the Potisioner

85 STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Hennepin, m:

F. A. Dickson, being duly owers, says that he is the foregoing Putitioner; that the same is true of his own knowledge except as a matters therein stated on information and belief, and as as such matters he believes the same to be true.

F. A. DECKSON.

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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of June, A. D. 1916.

[Notarial seal Hennepin County, Minn.]

J. A. SEBESTA,

Notary Public, Hennepin County, Misnesota.

My commission expires Feb. 27, 1921.

86 STATE OF MINISPOTA, Supreme Court:

LUCK LAND COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,

C. J. Minon, F. A. Dickson and R. L. Shitti, Also All Other Persons Unknown Claiming Any Right, Title, Estate, Interest or Lien in the Landa Described in the Complaint Herein, Defendant; and F. A. Dickson, Defendant and Appellant.

Order of Allowance of Writ of Error.

On this 16th day of June, A. D. 1916, the application of F. A. Dickson, defendant and appellant in the above entitled action came on to be heard, said F. A. Dickson being represented by counsel, and it appearing to the Court from the petition filed herein and from the files and records in this case, that his application should be granted, and that a transcript of the record, proceedings and papers upon which the judgment of the Court was rendered, properly certified, should be sent to the Supreme Court of the United States, as prayed, in order that such proceeding may be had as may be just,

New, therefore, it is ordered that the Writ of Error be allowed, and, a bend having been duly furnished by the petitioner within sixty (60) days after rendition of said judgment, that said bond shall operate as a supersedeas, and the Clerk shall stay the mandate to the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District in and for the County of Becker and State of Minnesota, until the further order of this Court; and that a true copy of the record, assignment of error and all proceedings in the case shall be transmitted to the Supress Court of the United States, duly certified according to law, in order that said Court may inspect the same and take such action theres as it doesno proper according to law.

CALVIN L. BROWN, Chief Justice Supreme Court of Minnesota.

861/2 [Endorsed:] 19539. Original, State of Minnasots, Supreme Court, Luck Land Company, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent vs. C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson and R. L. Smith: also all other persons unknown claiming any rights, title, estate, interest or lion in the lands described in the complaint herein, Defendants and F. A. Dickson, Defendant and Appellant. Petition for Writ of Error and order allowing Writ and granting supersodes.

Due personal service of the within Petition for Writ of Error and Order allowing Writ and granting supersedeas upon me this 22 day of June, 1916, is hereby admitted. Marshall A. Spooner, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. Charles C. Haupt, 1015 Merchants Nat'l Bank Bldg., 8t, Paul Minn.; Frank Healy, 519 Met. Life Bldg., Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Clyde R. White, 509-14 Minn. Loan & Trust Bldg., Minneapolis, Minnesota, Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error. Filed Jun 24, 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

State of Minnesota, Supreme Court.

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LUCK LAND COMPANY, A Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,

C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson, and R. L. Smith; also all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the real estate described in the complaint herein, and F. A. Dickson, Defendant and Appellant.

Bond on Writ of Error.

Know All Men By These Presents, That we, F. A. Dickson as principal, and the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, a corporation of Baltimore, Maryland, created, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Maryland, as surety, are firmly bound unto the Luck Land Company, a Minnesota corporation, its successors, representatives and assigns in the full and just sum of Five Hundred Dollars (\$500,00), to be paid unto the said Luck Land Company, its successors, representatives or assigns in good and lawful money of the United States of America, to which payment well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and soverally, by these presents.

Sealed with our seals and dated this 14th day of June, A. D. 1916. Whereas, lately, in the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, in a suit pending in said court between the Luck Land Company, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, and C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson and R. L. Smith, and also all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the real estate described in the complaint therein, Defendants, and F. A. Dickson, Defendant and Appellant, judgment was rendered against said Appellant F. A. Dickson, and the said Appellant has obtained a Writ of Error and filed a copy thereof in the office of the Clerk of said court, to reverse the judgment in the aforesaid court, and a Citation directed to said Luck Land Company, citing and admonishing it to be and appear at the Supreme Court of the United States at Washington, in the District of Columbia, within thirty days after the date thereof.

Now, the condition of the above obligation is such that if the said F. A. Dickson shall prosecute said Writ of Error to effect and ensure all damages and costs if it shall fail to make good its plea, then

the above obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.

(Signed)

SEAL. F. A. DICKSON UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO.,

By WIRT WILSON,

Its Attorney in Fact, and GEORGE E. MURPHY,

Its Att'y in Fact.

In the Presence of:

J. A. SEBESTA, CLARENCE V. CARLSON, As to F. A. Dickson. L. O'DONNELL,

H. J. WENTZEL.

STATE OF MINNESOTA, 88 County of Hennepin, 88:

On this 14th day of June, 1916, before me, a Notary Public within and for said County, personally appeared F. A. Dickson, to me known to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same as his free act and deed.

J. A. SEBESTA, (Signed) NOTARIAL SEAL. Notary Public, Hennepin County, Minnesota.

My commission expires Feb. 27, 1921.

STATE OF MINNESOTA, County of Hennepin, 88:

On this 14th day of June, A. D. 1916, before me a Notary Public within and for said County and State, personally appeared Wirt Wilson and George E. Murphy to me personally known, who being by me duly sworn upon oath did say that they are the agents and attorneys in fact of and for the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, a corporation of Baltimore, Maryland, created, organized, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Maryland; that the corporate seal affixed to the foregoing within instrument is the seal of said company; that the said seal was affixed and the said instrument was executed by authority of its Board of Directors; and the said Wirt Wilson and George E. Murphy did acknowledge that they executed the said instrument as the free act and deed of said company.

H. J. WENTZEL, (Signed) NOTARIAL SEAL. Notary Public, Hennepin County, Minnesota.

My commission expires, Sept. 16th, 1917.

The foregoing bond is hereby approved.

(Signed) CALVIN L. BROWN,

Chief Justice Supreme Court, State of Minnesota.

(Endorsed:) Filed Jun. 21, 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

89 Supreme Court of the United States.

F. A. DICKSON, Plaintiff in Error and C. J. MINOR and R. L. SMITH, also all other persons claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the real estate described in the complaint, Defendants,

LUCK LAND COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant in Error.

Writ of Error.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 88:

The President of the United States of America to the Honorable Judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, Greeting:

Because in the record and proceedings, as also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which is in the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, before you or some of you, being the highest court of law or equity in the said State in which a decision could be had in the said suit between the Luck Land Company, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, and C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson and R. L. Smith, and also all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the real estate described in the complaint therein, Defendants, and F. A. Dickson, Defendant and Appellant, wherein was drawn in question the validity of a statute of said State. on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision was in favor of such validity; and wherein was drawn in question the construction and effect of certain statutes of the United States, and the decision was against the title, right, privilege and immunity specially set up and claimed under said Statutes, a manifest error hath happened to the great

damage of the said F. A. Dickson, as by his complaint appears, we, being willing that such error, if any hath been, should be duly corrected, and full and speedy justice done to the party aforesaid, in this behalf, do command you, if judgment be therein given, that then under your seal, distinctly and openly, you send the record and proceedings aforesaid, with all things concerning the same, to the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, at the Capitol in the City of Washington, together with this Writ, so that you have the same at the said place, before the Justices aforesaid, within thirty (30) days from the date hereof, that the record and proceedings aforesaid being inspected, the said Justices of the Supreme Court may cause further to be done therein, to cor-

rect that error, what of right and according to the law and custom

of the United States ought to be done.

Witness The Honorable Edward Douglass White, Chief Justice of the United States, this 20th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred sixteen.

[Seal of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.]

> CHARLES L. SPENCER, Clerk of the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. By MARGARET L. MULLANE, Deputy.

The above Writ is allowed this 16th day of June, 1916.

CALVIN L. BROWN,

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota.

90½ [Endorsed:] Original. 19539. United States Supreme Court. F. A. Dickson, Plaintiff in Error and C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson and R. L. Smith, also all other persons claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the real estate described in the Complaint herein, Defendants, vs. Luck Land Company, a corporation, Defendant in Error. Writ of Error. Due personal service of the within Writ of Error is hereby admitted this 22nd day of June, 1916. Marshall A. Spooner, Attorney for Defendant in Error. Charles C. Haupt, 1015 Merchants Natl. Bank Bldg., St. Paul, Minnesota, Frank Healy, 519 Met. Life Bldg., Minneapolis, Minn., and Clyde R. White, 509-14 Minn. Loan & Trust Bldg., Minneapolis, Minnesota, Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error. Filed Jun. 24, 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

91 STATE OF MINNESOTA, Supreme Court, 88:

I, I. A. Caswell, clerk of the said court, do hereby certify that there was lodged with me as such clerk on June 24, 1916, in the matter of Luck Land Company, Respondent, vs. C. J. Minor, et al., Defendants, F. A. Dickson, Appellant.

1. The original bond of which a copy is herein set forth;

2. Copies of the writ of error, as herein set forth, -one for each

defendant and one to file in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at my office, in St. Paul, Minnesota, this 29th day of June, 1916.

[Seal of the Supreme Court, State of Minnesota.]

I. A. CASWELL, Clerk Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Supreme Court of the United States.

F. A. Dickson, Plaintiff in Error, and C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson and R. L. Smith, also all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the real estate described in the complaint herein, Defendants,

VS.

LUCK LAND COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant in Error.

Citation.

United States of America to Luck Land Company, a Corporation, Greeting:

You are hereby cited and admonished to be and appear at the Supreme Court of the United States, in the District of Columbia, within thirty (30) days after the date hereof, pursuant to Writ of Error filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, wherein F. A. Dickson is plaintiff in error and the Luck Land Company, a corporation is defendant in error, to show cause, if any there be, why the judgment rendered against the said plaintiff in error as in said Writ mentioned should not be corrected and speedy justice should not be done in that behalf.

Witness, The Honorable Calvin L. Brown, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, this 16th day of June.

A. D. 1916.

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CALVIN L. BROWN, Chief Justice Supreme Court of Minnesota.

92½ [Endorsed:] Original. 19539. Supreme Court of the United States. F. A. Dickson, Plaintiff in Error and C. J. Minor, F. A. Dickson, and R. L. Smith, also all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, interest or lien in the real estate described in the complaint herein, Defendants, vs. Luck Land Company, a corporation, Defendant in Error. Citation. Due personal service of the within Citation and receipt of copy thereof this 22 day of June, A. D. 1916, is hereby admitted. Marshall A. Spooner, Attorney for Defendant in Error. Frank Healy, 509 Metropolitan Life Bldg., Minneapolis, Minn., and Charles C. Haupt, 1015 Merchants Natl. Bank Bldg., St. Paul, Minnesota, and Clyde R. White, 509-14 Minn. Loan & Trust Bldg., Minneapolis, Minnesota, Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error. Filed Jun. 24, 1916. I. A. Caswell, Clerk.

93 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Supreme Court of Minnesota, ss:

In obedience to the commands of the within writ, I herewith transmit to the Supreme Court of the United States a duly certified transcript of the complete record and proceedings in the within entitled case, with all things concerning the same.